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PROTECTING INTRASTATE THREATENED 
SPECIES: DOES THE ENDANGERED 
..... SPECIES ACT ENCROACH ON 
TRADITIONAL STATE AUTHORITY AND 
EXCEED THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE? 
Bradford C. Mank* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mer broadly construing the scope of congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause for nearly sixty years, in 1995, the 
Supreme Court stunned many legal commentators by striking down 
a federal statute regulating intrastate gun possession near local 
schools in United States v. Lopez, l a five-to-four decision. The Court 
reasoned that such noneconomic activity was traditionally a state 
regulatory function and therefore outside the scope of the Clause.2 
Five years later in United States v. Morrison, 3 another five-to-four 
decision, the Court held that a federal statute penalizing intrastate 
gender-based violence intruded on traditional state authority over 
criminal matters and thus exceeded the scope of the Commerce 
Clause-despite congressional findings about the effects of gender-
based violence on the national economy.4 Because federal environ-
• James B. Helmer, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. B.A., 1983, Harvard 
University; J.D., 1987, Yale Law School. I thank John Copeland Nagle for his perceptive 
comments and Theresa Zawacki for her research assistance. All errors or omissions are my 
responsibility. 
1 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
2 Id. at 567·68. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 550. The same five justices were in the 
majority in United States 11. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County 11. United States Army CorpsofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC), 
discussed below. See infra notes 117·30, 145·75 and accompanying text (discussing positions 
taken by Justices). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in Lopez, 
Morrison and SWANCC. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 655; Solid Waste 
Agency, 531 U.S. at 176. 
3 529 U.S. 598. 
4 Id. at 614. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices 
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mental statutes rely on the Commerce Clause as the basis for 
congressional authority, a broad reading of Lopez and Morrison 
might call into question the constitutionality of at least some 
environmental statutes or regulations. 
In particular, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA")5 is 
likely to raise concerns under the Court's recent interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause because the statute regulates numerous 
species that have little commercial value and affects individual 
landowners.6 While the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is 
ultimately more concerned with the impacts of activities upon 
interstate commerce than the activities' location,7 most judges and 
commentators have assumed that whether a species is located in 
only one state or crosses state boundaries is an important factor. 8 
A large number of endangered or threatened 
species-approximately half-have habitats limited to one state.9 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. atGOO. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer again dissented. Id. 
5 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994). 
6 See Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, But Hardly Epochal for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 66-G7 (1996) [hereinafter 
Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep] (explaining certain provisions ofESA "regulate 
both commercial and noncommercial activities ... [and) often regulate local land use"); Omar 
N. White, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under 
the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGYL.Q. 215, 217-18 (2000) (comparing 
species with commercial value as tourist objects to species that "appear to be of interest only 
to researchers"; both are protected); Jeanine A. Scalero, Case Note, The Endangered Species 
Act:S Application to Isolated Species: A Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce?, 3 CHAP. 
L. REv. 317, 318-21 (2000) (discussing ESA). Whether the Endangered Species Act can be 
justified under the Treaty Power is beyond the scope of this Article. See White, supra, at 224-
34 (arguing Treaty Power provides less stable support for Endangered Species Act than 
Commerce Clause because treaties may be amended by either United States or another 
nation). 
7 See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce Clause). 
8 One commentator has questioned whether intrastate endangered species necessarily 
raise greater Commerce Clause issues than some species that live in more than one state, but 
lack significant commercial value. See John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets 
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REv. 174. 185 n.49 (1998) (,'Why the fact that 
a bird or animal crosses state lines of its own violation and without being itself an object of 
interstate commerce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains unexplained."); see 
infra notes 333-56 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce Clause and ESA). 
Nevertheless, most judges and commentators have assumed that exclusively intrastate 
species raise the most serious questions under the Commerce Clause. See infra notes 188-91 
and accompanying text (discussing significance of interstate characteristic). 
9 See Nat'l ABs'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(observing 521 of 1082 species in United States listed as endangered or threatened in 1997 
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Many of these intrastate endangered species do not currently 
possess significant economic value in ·interstate commerce. 10' 
Moreover, many threatened and endangered species that do cross 
state lines lack significant commercial value, and as a result, even 
their regulation under the ESA may present significant Commerce 
Clause issues.ll Furthermore, most endangered or threatened 
species are located on primarily non-federal land and thus not 
subject to protection under the Property Clause, discussed below. 12 
In 2001, the Supreme Court indirectly addressed the impact of 
Lopez and Morrison on federal environmental law. In Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers ("SWANCC"),13 yet another five-to-four decision, the 
Court held that an Army Corps of Engineers' ("the Corps") regula-
tion defining the Corps' jurisdiction to include "isolated" intrastate 
wetlands and waters that serve as habitat for migratory birds 
exceeded its statutory authority under the Clean Water Act. 14 The 
Court concluded that the Act's reliance on the term "navigable 
waters" in defining the scope of the statute's wetlands jurisdiction 
demonstrated that Congress did not intend to include "isolated" 
intrastate wetlands or waters that had no connection to navigable 
were found in only one state). 
10 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 182 (discussing several intrastate endangered species with 
no known commercial or recreational value); Eric Brignac, Recent Development, The 
Commerce Clause Justi{icatian of Federal Endangered Species Protectian: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 
79 N.C. L. REv. 873, 883 (2001) (arguing many endangered species have little commercial 
value). 
11 See infra notes 333-56 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of ESA and 
Commerce Clause). 
12 Scalero, supra note 6, at 321 ("[A]lmost 80% of protected species have some or all of 
their habitat on privately owned land."). According to the General Accounting Office, in 1993, 
781 species were listed under the ESA-over 90% of these species have some or all of their 
habitat on nonfederallands. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 502 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 
sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). Nearly three-fourths of the listed species 
had over 60% of their habitat on nonfederallands. Id. . 
13 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
14 Id. at 174; William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitutian: 
SWANCCandBeyond, 31EnvtL L.Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 10741 (News & Analysis) (July 2001) 
(discussing SWANCC); Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After 
SWANCC, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.) 10669 (News & Analysis) (June 2001) (discussing 
SWANCC); MayaR. Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency of North em Cook Countyv. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers: The Clean Water Act Bypasses a Commerce Clause Challenge, But 
Can the Endangered Species Act?, 7 HAsTINGsW.-Nw.J.ENVTL. L. &POL'y 191, 19~95 (2001) 
(discussing court's analysis in SWANCC). 
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waters within the Act's jurisdiction.15 The Court deliberately read 
the statute's jurisdiction over "navigable waters" narrowly to avoid 
the constitutional question of whether federal regulation of isolated 
waters and wetlands would violate the Commerce Clause. IS Because 
its decision was based solely on statutory grounds, the Court did not 
decide whether federal regulation of isolated intrastate wetlands 
exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, 
although, in dicta, the decision suggested that the Corps' interpreta-
tion may have exceeded that authority.17 Nevertheless, while not 
directly addressing the scope of the Commerce Clause, the SW ANCC 
Court's narrow interpretation of the Clean Water Act to exclude 
regulation of intrastate isolated wetlands reflected its concern that 
the Corps' broader interpretation would "alter[] the federal-state 
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional 
state power."18 
Now that it has decided the issue of isolated wetlands in 
SWANCC, the Court is likely to next address whether the Endan-
gered Species Act may provide federal protection to intrastate 
endangered species that lack significant commercial value. Unlike 
the situation in SWANCC, the Supreme Court cannot simply avoid 
the issue of whether the Endangered Species Act's regulation of 
intrastate species on non-federal land is constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause by applying a narrow construction of the statute. 
15 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 163·64 (interpreting Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act § 404(a), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994». See generally Funk, supra 
note 14, at 10746·59 (criticizing SWANCC for construing term "navigable waters" too 
narrowly in light of Riverside Bayview Homes precedent and legislative history of Clean 
Water Act); Michael P. Healy, Textualism's Limits on the Administrative State: Of Isolated 
Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10928, 10929·35 (News 
& Analysis) (Aug. 2001) (criticizing SWANCC for using restrictive textualist interpretation 
that was inconsistent with Court's prior interpretation of term "navigable waters" in 
Riverside Bayview Homes); Johnson, supra note 14, at 10672 (observing SWANCCinterpreted 
term "navigable waters" inconsistently with Riverside Bayview Homes precedent). 
16 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172· 73 (discussing how court analyzes administra· 
tive interpretations of statutes). See also infra Part III.E (discussing SWANCG). 
17 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172·73; Johnson, supra note 14, at 10673 (discussing 
constitutional impact of SW ANCG); Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195 C'Although the Court did 
not reach the Commerce Clause challenge to the Migratory Bird Rule, it did suggest that the 
Corps' interpretation breached the outer limits of congressional authority."). 
18 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173 C'[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, 
it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal·state balance" (quoting United 
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971»). 
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In Babbitt v. Sw~et Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon ("Sweet Home"),19 the Court itself upheld the Secretary of 
Interior's broad interpretation of its regulatory authority over 
private landowners.2o Accordingly, if a private landowner or a state 
challenges restrictions on the taking of endangered or threatened 
species, including destruction of their critical habitat, the Court will 
likely have to address whether the statute's application to intrastate 
species that lack significant commercial value is constitutional 
under the Commerce Clause. 
After the Supreme Court decided Lopez, a number of commenta-
tors speculated about its impact on the Endangered Species Act.21 
This Article reexamines the issue in light of Morrison and 
SWANCC. Part V demonstrates that, even after Lopez, Morrison, 
and SWANCC, the Commerce Clause reaches federal regulation of 
intrastate endangered or threatened species because conservation 
of such species has traditionally been a shared federal and state 
function that recognizes the legitimacy of federal regulation 
whenever the need for preservation is great and states have failed 
to address important conservation issues.22 Additionally, Part V 
shows federal regulation of endangered or threatened species does 
not undermine states' traditional role in regulating non-threatened 
species.23 Finally, Part VI establishes that the preservation of 
endangered or threatened species serves long-range national 
economic interests in preserving biodiversity and potentially 
valuable genetic material that deserve deference from courts even 
19 515 u.S. 687 (1995). 
20 Id. at 696.708. 
21 See generally Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, supra note 6, at 66·71 
(examining constitutionality of certain provisions of ESA after Lopez); White, supra note 6, 
at 240·53 (applying Lopez to ESA); DavidA. Linehan, Note, Endangered Regulation: Why the 
Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands 
Regulation, 2 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 365, 419·27 (1998) (arguing ESA infringes on u[l]and use 
regulation ... [which] is traditionally within the expertise of the states and their local 
political subdivisions, not Washington, D.C."); Scalero, Note, supra note 6, at 331·49 
(discussing court decision since Lopez regarding endangered species and concluding whether 
Lopez is ureal threat" to environmental regulation "can only be tested with time."). 
22 See infra notes 296·310 and accompanying text (analyzing traditional state activities). 
23 See infra notes 357·72 and accompanying text (arguing ESAdoes not blur line between 
federal and state authority). 
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though their exact value is unascertainable at present.24 Applying 
a rational basis test, Part VI concludes that courts should defer to 
Congress' goal of preserving our genetic and biological heritage as 
a rea"sonable policy substantially advancing America's long-term 
commercial goalS.25 In light of their concurring opinion in Lopez and 
support for protection of endangered species on private lands in 
Sweet Home, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy may provide key 
swing votes if the Court is to take a more deferential approach to 
federal regulation of intrastate endangered species under the 
Commerce Clause.26 
II. ENDANGERED SPECIES Ac:r 
A. THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
The current Endangered Species Act applies to endangered or 
threatened species of fish and wildlife on all land in the United 
States and territorial seas.27 By contrast, the Endangered Species 
Acts of 1966 and 1969 protected species on federal land only, and, 
as a result, had failed to address the growing problem of species 
extinction.28 In response to these concerns, Congress amended the 
2. See infra notes 429·38 and accompanying text. 
2S See infra notes 373·438 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 67·68 and accompanying text (discussing moderate positions taken of 
these justices in previous cases). 
27 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 
(1995). However, endangered or threatened plants are only protected on federallands or non· 
federallandcovered by a state statute. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B)(1994). See generally George 
Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American Law: The Recent 
Evolution of Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 247,278·304 
(1987) (discussing ESA's limited protection of plants). 
28 The Endangered Species Act of 1966 established a National Wildlife Refuge System 
and prohibited disturbing animals or habitat within the System. Pub. L. No. 89·669, § 4, 80 
Stat. 926, 927-29 (1966). The Endangered Species Act of 1969 required the Secretary of the 
Interior to develop a list of endangered species and prohibited the importation of these 
animals or any of their bypro ducts without a permit. Pub. L. No. 91·135, §§ 2·3(a), 83 Stat. 
275, 275 (1969). These statutes also required federal agencies to conserve species "insofar as 
is practicable," Pub. L. No. 89·669, § 1(b), 80 Stat. 926, 926 (1966), and to the "extent 
practicable," § 3(a), 83 Stat. at 275. See Davina Karl Kalle, Note, Evolution of Wildlife 
Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered 
Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 448, 449·54 (1993) 
(outlining 1966 and 1969 Acts). 
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ESA in 1973 to prohibit takings of endangered species on all land in 
the United States, including state, municipal, or private land.29 In 
TVA v. Hill, so the Supreme Court described the 1973 Act as "the 
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered 
species ever enacted by any nation."Sl According to the Hill Court, 
"[t] he plain intent of Congress in enacting [the ESA] was to halt and 
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This 
is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally 
every section of the statute."S2 For example, section 2 of the Act 
provides that op.e of its main purposes is "to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend may be conserved ... ."S3 
To a significant extent, Congress relied on its Commerce Power 
as a basis for enacting the 1973 ESA Amendments. For instance, 
the statute states that many of the species threatened with 
extinction are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational, and- scientific value to the Nation and its people."s4 
The statute also observes that "various species offish, wildlife, and 
plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a 
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by 
adequate concern and conservation."35 
In the 1973 ESA's legislative history, Congress emphasized the 
potential future economic and medical benefits of preserving a wide 
variety of species and genetic heritage.36 The House Report 
explained: 
As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants 
and animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure 
29 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994); Kaile, supra note 28, at 556. 
30 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
31 Id. at 180. 
32 Id. at 184. 
33 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994); Babbittv. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995). 
:u 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3). 
as Id. § 1531(a)(l). 
36 See Nat'l ABs'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
e[O]ne of the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect endangered species from 
'takings' was the importance of continuing availability of a wide variety of species to 
interstates commerce."). 
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for products that they are in a position to supply 
(usually unwillingly) we threaten their-and our 
own-genetic heritage. 
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalcula-
ble .... 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for 
cancer or other scourges, present or future, may lie 
locked up in the structures of plants which may yet 
be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More to the 
point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those poten-
tial cures by eliminating those plants for all time? 
Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.37 
The ESA requires the Secretary of Interior to determine which 
species are "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant 
portion of [their] range."38 Then the Secretary must establish a list 
of all "endangered" and "threatened" species, and also identify 
critical habitat necessary for the survival of such species.39 The 
Secretary next determines whether a species is endangered or 
threatened "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial 
data available to him after conducting a review of the status of the 
37 H.R. REP. No. 93·412, at 4·5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate Report on the 1969 ESA 
noted: 
From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of an endangered species 
of wildlife with some commercial value may permit the regeneration of 
that species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be 
resumed. In such a case businessmen may profit from the trading and 
marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years, where 
otherwise it would have been completely eliminated from commercial 
channels in a very brief span of time. Potentially more important, 
however, is the fact that with each species we eliminate, we reduce the 
[genetic] pool ... available for use by man in future years. Since each 
living species and subspecies has developed in a unique way to adapt itself 
to the difficulty of living in the world's environment, as a species is lost, 
its distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to 
mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to 
disease or environmental contaminant, is also irretrievably lost. 
S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969). 
38 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). The Secretary of Commerce also plays a role. Id. 
39 Id. § 1533(a). 
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species .... "40 Only after determining that a species is endangered 
or threatened can the Secretary issue a regulation protecting it.41 
Then, the Secretary must develop recovery plans for the "conserva-
tion and survival" of listed species.42 Once a species has recovered 
and its survival is no longer threatened, federal regulatory control 
ceases, and, accordingly, the animal is subject only to state author-
.ty 43 1 . 
The ESA's regulation of federal lands, its authorization for the· 
acquisition of land to support conservation efforts, and its restric-
tions on the behavior of federal agencies does not raise any serious 
constitutional concerns under either the Spending Clause44 or the 
Property Clause.45 Under section 5 of the ESA, the Secretary may 
acquire land to assist in the preservation of such species, and 
section 6 provides that the Secretary should do so in cooperation 
with the States.46 Section 7 of the ESA directs federal agencies to 
"insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by [such 
agency ... is not likely to] jeopardize the continued existence of 
[endangered species or threatened species] or result in the destruc-
tion or modification of [critical] habitat."47 Under this section, all 
federal agencies must consult with the Secretary before undertaking 
projects that could harm endangered or threatened species or their 
critical habitat.48 
Section 9 is the most controversial portion of the ESA because it 
extends the Act's coverage to non-federal lands, including private 
40 Id. § 1533(b)(l)(A). 
~l Id. § 1533(d). 
42 Id. § 1533(f). 
~3 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 438, 503 (4th Cir. 2000). 
~~ See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (detailing Congress's spending power); White, supra 
note 6, at 223 (observing certain provisions in ESA are valid pursuant to Spending Clause). 
See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (permitting Congress to 
condition funds on State's adoption of minimum drinking age); Denis Binder, The Spending 
Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147 (2001) 
(discussing how Spending Clause can validate environmental legislation) . 
.s See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (detailing Congress's control over federal lands); 
Sophie Akins, Note, Congress' Property Clause Power to Prohibit Taking Endangered Species, 
28 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167, 183·86 (2000) (noting Congress's broad authority over both 
private and public land under Property Clause) . 
.j6 16 U.S.C. §§ 1534, 1535(a) (1994). 
~7 Id. § 1536(a)(2) . 
.j6 Id. § 1536(a)(3); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172·73 (1978). 
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property. Section 9(a)(1) prohibits any person from taking any 
endangered or threatened species without a permit or other 
authorization.49 The statute defines the term "take" to include any 
private activities "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct.,,5o Any person who knowingly destroys the critical habitat 
of an endangered species is subject to criminal penalties-up to a 
fine of $50,000, one year in prison or both.51 
To implement section 9(a)(1)'s prohibition against taking 
endangered species, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") of the 
Department of Interior has issued regulations forbidding "signifi-
cant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or 
injures wildlife."52 In other words, private landowners may not 
destroy the critical habitat of endangered species. However, a 
landowner may apply for an incidental takings permit that allows 
some incidental harm to endangered species from habitat modifica-
tion if the owner presents an acceptable habitat conservation plan 
that demonstrates that the modification is consistent with the long-
term survival of the species. 53 
B. SWEET HOME 
In Sweet Home,54 decided two months after the Lopez decision, 
the Supreme Court upheld regulations prohibiting private landown-
ers from destroying critical habitat and indirectly taking endan-
gered species unless they obtain an incidental taking permit. 55 
Justice Stevens' majority opinion concluded that regulation was 
consistent with section 9(a)(1)'s text and the goals of the Endan-
gered Species Act.66 First, the Court used the dictionary definition 
49 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
wId. § 1532(19). 
51 Id. § 1540(b). 
52 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2001). 
53 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) ("[I]fsuch taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, 
the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."). 
54 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
55 Id. at 696-708. 
sa Id. at 697-99. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory 
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better Than 
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of the verb form of "harm" to find that the regulation's inclusion of 
indirect harm to endangered species from destruction or harm to the 
species' critical habitat was consistent with the "ordinary under-
standing" of the word and that such a definition "naturally encom-
passes habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to 
members of an endangered or threatened species."57 According to 
the Court, "the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's 
decision to extend protection against activities that cause the 
precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid."58 Addition-
ally, the Court determined that Congress' addition in 1982 of the 
section 10 "incidental take" permit provision,59 which allows the 
Secretary to grant an exception to the section 9(a)(1)(B) takings 
prohibition by granting permits activities that will cause incidental 
harm to an endangered species if the applicant provides a satisfac-
tory conservation plan for minimizing any such harm, was evidence 
that Congress understood the Act to apply to indirect as well as 
direct harm because the most likely use for such a permit was to 
avert liability for habitat modification.6o Finally, the Court invoked 
the Chevron deference principle-that courts should defer to an 
agency's interpretation if a statute is ambiguous and the interpreta-
tion is reasonable.61 The Court stated that "[t]he latitude the ESA 
gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the 
degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, 
establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's 
reasonable interpretation," and that "[w]hen it enacted the ESA, 
Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to 
the Secretary. . .. The proper interpretation of a term such as 
'harm' involves a complex policy choice."62 The Court concluded: 
''When Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, 
we are especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy for 
Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1263-64 (1996) (examining Sweet Home 
decision from textualist approach). 
57 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697-98. 
sa Id. at 698.99. 
59 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
60 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700·01. 
61 Id. at 703·08; Mank, supra note 56, at 1265; see generally Chevron U.S.A. v. N at'l Res. 
Det: Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing "Chevron" principle). 
62 Sw!!et Home, 515 U.S. at 703, 708. 
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his.,,63 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the 
words to "take" and to "harm" as used in the Act could not possibly 
mean "habitat modification."64 
The five justices who constituted the majority in Lopez, Morrison, 
and SWANCC-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-did not vote together in Sweet Home. 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion,65 and Justice O'Connor 
concurred in the decision with the understanding that the FWS 
regulation was limited to "significant habitat modification that 
causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or 
injury to identifiable protected animals."66 While concerned with 
preserving the role of states in a federalist system, Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy appear more willing to accept national 
regulatory schemes than Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas.67 As discussed below, Justice Kennedy wrote a 
concurring opinion in Lopez, joined by Justice O'Connor, that 
arguably took a more moderate approach to judicial review of 
legislation under the Commerce Clause.68 In light of their votes in 
Sweet Home and Lopez, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor might be 
reluctant to conclude that the regulation that they upheld in Sweet 
Home is invalid under the Commerce Clause, although they never 
had to address whether the regulation was valid for purely intra-
state endangered species as opposed to those that are subject to 
interstate transportation or trade. 
In both Hill and Sweet Home, the Supreme Court broadly 
construed the scope of the ESA.69 However, neither case directly 
addressed whether Congress has the authority under the Commerce 
63 [d. at 708. 
64 [d. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Mank, supra note 56, at 1265-66 (discussing 
dissenting opinion in Sweet Home). 
65 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 688. 
66 [d. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
67 See generally Byron Dailey, Note, The Five Faces of Federalism: A State-Power Quintet 
Without a Theory, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1248-50, 1267-87 & passim (2001)(arguing Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy apply more moderate approach to state rights and national power 
issues than Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and particularly Justice Thomas). 
63 See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (discuBsing Justice Kennedy's Lopez 
concurrence). 
69 See supra notes 30-33, 55-68 and accompanying text (discussing Hill & Sweet Home). 
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Clause to protect intrastate endangered species that are located on 
state, local, or private lands. Many endangered species are located 
in only one state, do not cross state lines, and have insignificant 
commercial or recreational value.70 
III. THE SUPREME COURT NARROWS THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: 
LOPEZAND MORRlSON 
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to "regulate 
Commerce with. foreign Nations, and among the several 
States ... .'>71 While the scope of congressional authority to regulate 
interstate commerce is often the subject of litigation, courts have 
been especially concerned with whether various intrastate activities 
sufficiently affect interstate commerce to justify federal regulation. 
Thus, in determining whether the Commerce Clause authorizes 
regulation of various endangered species, the determinative i~sue is 
whether those species, either individually or perhaps in the 
aggregate, affect inter~tate commerce. However, courts have often 
focused on whether an activity or species is purely intrastate, even 
though intrastate travel by itself is not determinative in deciding 
whether an activity or species substantially affects interstate 
commerce. 
A. A BRIEF mSTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
In Gibbons v. Ogden,72 Chief Justice Marshall first articulated 
the notion that Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce.73 
10 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 8, at 182·83 (identifying Peck's cave amphipod, Cowhead 
Lake thi chub, and Desert milk·vetch as being among species that are "hard[] to connect to 
interstate commerce"); Brignac, supra note 10, at 883·84 (arguing that plants and some 
animals on endangered species list have "independent commercial value [that] is highly 
speculative at best"). 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
72 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
73 Id. at 186·98. See also Louis J. Virelli ill & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether 
They Want It or Not": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil 
Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 927·29 (2001) 
(arguing Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons adopted broad interpretation of Commerce 
Power); Akins, supra note 45, at 169·71 (arguing Justice Marshall's Gibbons opinion implied 
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According to the Gibbons Court, the Commerce Power "is the power 
to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be 
governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.,,74 However, the Court also stated that the Commerce 
Clause does not apply to intrastate activities "which are completely 
within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with 
which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing 
some of the general powers of the government."75 
Though generally taking an expansive approach to the Commerce 
Power, Gibbons was vague enough to allow narrower interpretations 
by subsequent courts. Before 1936, the Supreme Court often read 
the Commerce Clause narrowly to exclude intrastate manufacturing 
activities even if a product later entered interstate commerce on the 
grounds that the intrastate manufacturing only indirectly affected 
interstate commerce.76 Beginning in 1937, in the seminal case of 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,77 the Court extended the 
breadth of the Commerce Power, holding that intrastate activities 
that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect 
that commerce from burdens and obstructions" are within the scope 
of the Commerce Clause.78 After 1937, the Court applied a rational 
basis review to legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause and did not generally distinguish between activities that 
Commerce Power reaches intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce). 
7. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. 
75 [d. at 195; see Akins, supra note 45, at 170 C'The Court ... acknowledged that the 
States have the sole ability to regulate completely intrastate Commerce."). 
76 See Hammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271·72 (1918) (holding Commerce Clause did 
not authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not interstate commerce 
even though products later entered interstate commerce), overruled by United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I, 12·13 (1895) 
(holding sugar manufacturers were outside Sherman Act because sugar manufacturing was 
intrastate activity even if sugar later entered interstate commerce). 
77 310 U.S. 1 (1937). 
78 [d. at 37. Compare id. at 36-39 (holding statute prohibiting unfair labor practices is 
within Commerce Power), with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936) 
(rejecting similar labor laws in Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as exceeding Commerce 
Power). See generally White, supra note 6, at 235 (describing court's deference to Congress 
in legislating based on Commerce Clause). 
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directly or indirectly affected interstate commerce.79 From 1937 to 
1995, the Supreme Court deferentially reviewed most regulatory 
laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause to the point that the 
limitations of the clause became almost a nonissue. so 
In Wickard v. Filburn, S1 the Court broadly construed the scope of 
the Commerce Clause in holding that the federal government could 
forbid a farmer from growing wheat exclusively for home use 
because homegrown wheat competes with wheat in interstate 
commerce.S2 Wickard is notable both for the Court's willingness to 
find that a purely intrastate activity co~d substantially affect 
interstate commerce and for its willingness to aggregate small 
individual effects in determining the activity's impact.S3 The 
Wickard Court concluded that the Commerce Power reaches 
individually insignificant activities that have a substantial economic 
impact when aggregated "together with that of many others 
similarly situated."s4 In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to 
Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce 
Clause authority over intrastate activity."s5 Under Wickard, a very 
wide range of intrastate activities might qualify for regulation under 
the Commerce Clause. 
Recently, the Supreme Court has generally sought to limit the 
Commerce Power to legislation regulating "economic" activities that 
have a substantial impact on ,interstate commercial matters, 
'19 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606' (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating 
Court's finding in Jones & Mclaughlin Steel has "since ,been seen beginning the abandon-
ment, in practical purposes, ofthe formalistic distinction between direct and indirect effects"); 
Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: Lopez, Morrison, SW ANCC, 
and Gibbs, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10413, 10413 (News & Analysis) (Apr. 2001). 
80 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-83 (1981) 
(approving under Commerce Power federal regulation of intrastate mining activities under 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to prevent ruinous competition 
among states likely to lead to inadequate environmental standards); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding use of Commerce Power to enact 
civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations); Brignac, 
supra note 10, at 874 ("After the Court's decision in NLRB, the Commerce Clause was a 
virtual blank check that Congress could use to pass almost any legislation."); Dral & Phillips, 
supra note 79, at 10413 (pointing out "broad and sweeping power of Congress to legislate"). 
81 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
82 [d. at 125-30. 
83 [d. at 123-30. 
81 [d. at 128. 
as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
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although the line between economic and noneconomic issues is often 
not clear.86 Additionally, the Court is especially likely to scrutinize 
federal regulations that infringe on areas of traditional state 
concerns, such as criminal or family law, even if Congress makes 
findings about their indirect economic impact on the national 
economy.87 
B. LOPEZ 
In United States v. Lopez,88 the Supreme Court, for the first time 
since 1936, held a federal statute unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause.89 The Lopez Court held that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"), which made possession of a gun 
within a school zone a federal offense, exceeded Congress' authority 
under the Commerce Clause despite congressional findings that 
violent crime affects interstate commerce.90 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's majority opinion narrowly read the scope of the 
Commerce Clause by limiting congressional authority to "economic 
activity" that has substantial effects on interstate commerce.91 
Analyzing previous Commerce Clause cases, the Lopez Court 
explained that Congress could regulate three broad categories of 
activity: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce"; (2) 
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things 
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities"; arid (3) "those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.,,92 The Court concluded 
86 See id. at 566 (stating such "legal uncertainty" is mandated by enumeration of powers 
under Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
608·09 (2000) (describing circumscriptions on Congress's power to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause). See generally Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10415·24 (describing 
Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison). 
87 Charles Tiefer, After Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws from 
Commerce Clause Challenge?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Instit.) 10888, 10890 (News & 
Analysis) (Oct. 2000). 
86 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
89 Id. at 567.68; Funk, supra note 14, at 10763. 
90 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559·67. 
91 Id. at 559·63; Funk, supra note 14, at 10763. 
92 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558·59 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146. 150 (1971) and 
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that possession of a gun is not primarily an economic activity and, 
therefore, clearly did not fit the first two categories.93 Additionally, 
the Court determined that gun possession could not be regulated 
under the third category as an activity that "substantially affects" 
interstate commerce because it was neither commercial in its own 
right, nor was it an essential component of interstate economic 
activity. 94 Moreover, the Court explained, Congress had made no 
specific findings about the effect of gun possession in school zones 
on interstate commerce, but only more generalized conclusions 
about the impact of violent crime in general on interstate 
commerce.95 Because Congress had no rational basis for finding 
that gun possession within school zones has a substantial impact on 
interstate commerce, the Court held the statute was unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause.96 The Court's only concession 
was its suggestion that Congress could enact legislation regulating 
some intrastate activities that lack a substantial impact on 
interstate commerce if the regulatory scheme was "an essential part 
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory 
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated."97 . 
The Court suggested that it would carefully review congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause whenever federal legislation 
attempted to regulate areas traditionally controlled by state or local 
governments.98 In Lopez, the Court rejected the "costs of crime" and 
"national productivity" justifications for the GFSZA because, under 
these theories, it was "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal 
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education 
where States historically have been sovereign."99 The Court was 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981». 
93 See id. at 559 (explaining "first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of' 
when GFSZA is viewed in this framework). 
~ See id. at 561 (stating GFSZA is not "an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity"); Dral & Philips, supra note 79, at 10414 (discussing shortcomings 
highlighted in majority opinion). 
95 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-64. 
96 [d. at 567-68. 
f17 [d. at 561; Adrian Vermeule, Dialogue, Centralization and the Commerce Clause, 31 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (News & Analysis) 11334, 11335 (Nov. 2001). 
98 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-68. 
99 [d. at 564. 
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clearly concerned that an expansive reading of the Commerce 
Clause to include noneconomic activities that are traditionally 
regulated by states would undermine our federal system of govern-
ment.100 The Supreme Court stressed that the regulation of school 
zones was within the "general police power" retained by the states 
and thus not within the normal scope of the Commerce Clause. 101 
In his concurring opinion, which Justice O'Connor joined, Justice 
Kennedy took a more "pragmatic" approach to interpreting the 
Commerce Clause than the majority and dissenting opinions. 102 
Justice Kennedy argued that courts should interpret the outer 
boundaries of the Commerce Power in light of the overarching goal 
of balancing federal and state authority, especially in noncommer-
cial areas traditionally regulated by states.103 Because education is 
a traditional state concern, Kennedy argued that courts should be 
cautious in using the Commerce Clause to authorize federal 
legislation that regulates "areas of traditional state concern" upon 
which "States lay claim by right of history and expertise."104 In 
particular, he contended that one of the great dangers of the federal 
government regulating areas of traditional state concern is that "the 
boundaries between the spheres offederal and state authority would 
blur and political responsibility would become illusory."105 Yet 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence implied a broader reading of the 
Commerce Power than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion 
100 See id. at 561 n.3, 564, 567-68 (stating that delicate balance of power exists between 
state and federal government, and balance is disturbed when Congress enacts legislation 
intruding on state policy decisions); accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 
(2000) (''The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is 
truly local."). 
101 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions where, we would 
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States."). 
102 See Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 
793,801-04 (1996) (describing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" concurrence in Lopez as more 
moderate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion); Stephen R. McAllister, Essay, Is 
There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Constitutional Power Under the Commerce Clause?, 
44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 238-42 (1996) (praising Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach to 
federalism as model for future cases). 
103 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576·77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also White, supra note 6, at 
238·39 (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurrence). 
1~ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
lOS Id. at 577. 
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by suggesting that Congress could regulate noncommercial activities 
having a nexus to interstate commerce if the legislation does not 
intrude on areas within the traditional state police power. lOG 
Because Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are perceived by many as 
the key swing votes on Commerce Clause issues, Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence suggests that the impact of legislation on the balance 
between federal and state authority is ar:t important factor to 
consider in addition to whether the regulated activity is commercial 
in nature. 107 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that Congress 
had a rational basis for finding a substantial relation between the 
possession of a gun in a school zone and interstate commerce.108 He 
contended that the majority opinion was inconsistent with several 
Court decisions that had sustained legislation that had far less 
impact on interstate commerce than the GFSZA.109 Additionally, he 
maintained that the majority's distinction between "commercial" 
and "noncommercial" transactions was 'unworkable because of the 
difficulty in drawing such a line.110 Furthermore, he argued that 
106 Id. at 578. See White, supra note 6, at 238·39 (analyzing Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion); Linehan, Note, supra note 21, at 404-05 ("The Act usurped from the states 'their own 
judgment in an' area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise, and it does 
so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense 
of that term.' "); Scalero, Note, supra note 6, at 329 (noting Justice Kennedy's feeling if there 
is no infringement on state sovereignty under Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate 
noncommercial activity with "nexus to interstate commerce"). Arguably, even Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's majority opinion implied that Congress might use the Commerce Power to 
regulate noneconomic activities that do not intrude on traditional areas of state control. See 
Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 73, at 954 ('The Court criticized the statute for regulating 
non·economic and interfering with existing criminal laws, an area it considered traditionally 
reserved for the statej. • 
107 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576·81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy 
are often swing votes in five·to·fourvotes in the Supreme Court. During the 2000·2001 term, 
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were in the majority in those cases twenty out of twenty· six 
cases, the most of any Justices on the Court. See Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Review, 2000· 
2001 Term: Taking Charge, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at C3 (breaking down voting alignment 
for 2000·01 term). 
108 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. at 625·27 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding federal loan 
sharking criminal statute was within Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964) (holding Civil Rights Act of 1964 within Commerce Clause), Daniel v. Paul, 395 
U.S. 298 (1969) (holding regulation of intrastate amusement park within Commerce Clause), 
and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding regulation of consumption of homegrown 
wheat within Commerce Clause»; see also Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10414-15. 
1\0 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627·29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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this distinction was inconsistent with the Constitution because the 
Commerce Clause allows regulation of either type of activity as long 
as it substantially affects interstate commerce. lll Finally, Breyer's 
dissent contended that the majority was creating "legal uncertainty 
in an area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well 
settled." 112 
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion criticized the majority for 
departing from the highly deferential rational basis review applied 
by the Court since 1937.113 He argued that the Court had returned 
to the uncertain pre-1937 jurisprudence by qualifying its rational 
basis review depending on whether a subject was commercial or 
noncommercial despite the difficulties in classifying many 
activities. 114 Furthermore, he contended that the Court had 
introduced even more uncertainty by suggesting that its application 
of rational basis review would depend on whether a statute dealt 
with an area of traditional state regulation Qr contained explicit 
factual findings supporting a congressional determination that an 
activity substantially affected interstate commerce. 115 
C. MORRISON 
The Violence Against Women Act ("VAW.N') created a "right to be 
free from crimes of violence motivated by gender" and provided a 
civil damages remedy for victims of gender-based violence. 116 In 
United States v. Morrison,117 the Supreme Court held that the 
VAWA, like the GFSZA, was beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause because the activity was essentially noneconomic and only 
indirectly connected to interstate commerce. l1S Following Lopez, the 
1lI [d. at 627-28; see also Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10418-21. 
112 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 630. 
113 [d. at 603-08 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
114 [d. at 608. 
115 [d. at 608-11. Justice Souter also dissented in Morrison, discussed below, arguing that 
the Court should have applied rational basis review to a statute which provided a civil 
damages remedy for victims of gender-based violence. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 628-36 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
116 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
117 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
118 [d. at 613-19. The Court also held that Congress lacked authority under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact § 13981 of the VAWA, id. at 619-27, butthat issue is beyond 
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Morrison Court emphasized that "in those cases where we have 
sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the 
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in 
question has been some sort of economic endeavor ."119 Additionally, 
Morrison emphasized that "the existence of congressional findings 
is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of 
Commerce Clause legislation."12o The Court rejected congressional 
findings that gender-based violence had impacts on interstate 
commerce because the causal chain between such crimes and any 
economic impacts was too attenuated.121 The congressional findings 
on the VAWAimproperly"[sought] to follow the but-for causal chain 
from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which 
has always been the prime object of the states' police power) to every 
attenuated effect upon interstate commerce."122 
Moreover, the Court "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may 
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.,,123 According to 
the Court, permitting aggregation of noneconomic activities as a 
basis for regulation under the Commerce Clause would permit the 
federal government to regulate virtually every activity.124 Allowing 
Congress to justify legislation by aggregating noneconomic activities 
under the Commerce Clause would "completely obliterate the 
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority.,,125 
The Court noted as an example that the aggregation of noneconomic 
activities could be applied just as easily "to family law and other 
areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of 
marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is 
undoubtedly significant."126 The Court stated that courts should 
the scope of this Article. 
119 Id. at 611. 
120 Id. at 614. 
121 Id. at 615-16. 
122 Id. at 615. 
123 Id.at617. 
124 Id. at615-17. "If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any 
crime as long as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial 
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption." Id. at 615. 
125 Id. at 615. 
125 Id. at 615-16. 
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limit the aggregation principle to economic activities, 127 emphasizing 
that "in every case where [the Court had] sustained federal 
regulation under Wickard's aggregation principle, the regulated 
activity was of an apparent commercial character." 128 The Morrison 
Court found that the VA WA impermissibly intruded on traditional 
state authority over family law and criminal issues.129 The Court 
noted that there was "no better example of the police power, which 
the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the 
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its 
victims.,,130 As in Lopez, the Morrison court emphasized that courts 
should carefully evaluate legislation in view of federalism concerns: 
"The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local. ... "131 
D. TO WHAT EXTENT DID LOPEZAND MORRISON CHANGE THE POWER OF 
CONGRESS UNDER THE COMl\.1ERCE CLAUSE? 
Many commentators have criticized Lopez and Morrison for 
failing to articulate a clear standard for evaluating the Commerce 
Power.132 The two cases purported to apply a traditional rational 
basis standard of review.1s3 However, the actual standard applied 
appears to be far more stringent than previous cases.134 For 
example, the Morrison Court did not defer to congressional findings 
127 [d. at 610-11. 
128 [d. at 611 n.4. 
129 [d. at 618. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. at 599. 
132 See, e.g., Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417-18 (arguing Lopez and Morrison 
purported to apply rational basis test for whether legislation is authorized under Commerce 
Clause, but in fact applied more stringent and uncertain standard); Jason Everett Goldberg, 
Note, Substantial Activity and Non-Economic Commerce: Toward a New Theory of the 
Commerce Clause, 9 J.L. & POL'y 563, 571, 594-603 (2001) (arguing Morrison claimed to apply 
rational basis review, but actually applied far more stringent standard that it never clearly 
articulated). 
133 In Morrison, the Court declared: "Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch 
of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment upon a plain showing 
that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." 529 U.S. at 607. 
1M Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417-18; see Brignac, supra note 10, at 881-82 
(arguing Supreme Court's rational basis review has paid "lip service" to judicial deference in 
recent opinions, but Morrison aggressively reviewed whether activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce). 
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that gender-based violence substantially affected interstate 
commerce, findings that should have cleared the traditional rational 
basis test. 135 By failing to articulate a clear new standard for 
reviewing statutes under the Commerce Clause, the Lopez and 
Morrison decisions have created considerable uncertainty for lower 
courts attempting to follow the Supreme Court's evolving jurispru-
dence in this area.136 
Because of the differing views about the scope of the Commerce 
Power, even among the majority in Lopez and Morrison, the impact 
of these decisions for future cases remains uncertain. In his 
concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Thomas stated that he would 
return to the "original understanding" of the Commerce Clause 
when it was ratified in the late 1780s, which limited the Commerce 
Power to transportation of goods across state boundaries. 137 He 
argued that the "substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 
20th century"13S and suggested that the Court should overrule it. 139 
In his concurring opinion in Morrison, Justice Thomas reiterated his 
"view that the very notion of a 'substantial effects' test under the 
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding 
of Congress' powers and this Court's early Commerce Clause 
cases."140 However, no other justice joined Justice Thomas' Lopez 
and Morrison concurrences. 
By" contrast, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez, 
which was joined by Justice O'Connor, clearly approv:ed of the 
"substantial effects" test. 141 Justice Kennedy argued that the Court 
185 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (stating deferential presumption of constitutionality 
standard). See also icl. at 614-15 (declining to defer to congressional finding that gender-
based violence substantially affects interstate commerce); Brignac, supra note 10, at 882 
(,Morrison therefore demands that the courts not give Congress the benefit of judicial 
deference but instead examine the wisdom of its judgment."). 
138 See Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417-18 (criticizing Lopez and Morrison for 
using uncertain standard of review); Goldberg, supra note 132, at 606·08 (arguing uncertain 
standard of review in Lopez and Morrison has confused lower courts). 
137 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585·602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(rejecting idea Congress can regulate everYthing that affects interstate commerce); Dailey, 
supra note 67, at 1248 (stating Justice Thomas felt Commerce Clause "grants Congress power 
to regulate only actual trafficking of merchandise across state borders"). 
138 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 596. 
139 Id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring); Dailey, supra note 67, at 1248. 
140 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
141 Id. at 368. 
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could not return to an 18th century conception of the Commerce 
Power in light of sixty years of precedent reading that power far 
more broadly.142 While accepting the substantial effects standard 
applied in numerous cases between 1937 and 1995, Justice Kennedy 
interpreted the Commerce Clause in light of federalist principles 
that prohibit Congress from enacting legislation that has only 
incidental commercial concerns and interferes with traditional state 
functions. 143 The current composition of the Supreme Court 
suggests that Justice Kennedy's approach to federalism and the 
Commerce Clause is more likely to be influential than Justice 
Thomas' call for a return to early 19th Century jurisprudence.144 
Nonetheless, there is considerable uncertainty about how the Court 
will address future cases involving the Commerce Power. 
E. SWANCC 
In SWANGG,145 the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Army Corps of 
Engineers ("the Corps") could regulate isolated intrastate waters 
and wetlands that are not connected or adjacent to navigable 
waters. While not directly relying on Lopez and Morrison, the 
SWANGG decision reflects similar concerns with limiting the scope 
of the Commerce Clause to economic matters and to protecting 
"traditional state power" from "federal encroachment." 146 The Court 
1~2 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 570·74 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing Court's 
development of Commerce Power in past cases); Althouse, supra note 102, at 802 (arguing 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez recognized need for modern understanding of 
Commerce Power in light of today's economic system); McAllister, supra note 102, at 229 
(analyzing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion); Dailey, supra note 67, at 1248·49 (arguing 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez clearly rejected Justice Thomas' proposed 
return to 18th century understanding of commerce). 
143 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575·83 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing duty to protect 
federalism and limit Commerce Power). 
1~4 See Dailey, supra note 67, at 1286·88 (discussing how five justices-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas-vote in federalism cases and 
arguing Justice Thomas' views about Commerce Power are "extreme"). 
I~ 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
l.s See Solid Waste Agencyv. United States Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172·74 (2001) 
C'[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly 
changed the federal·state balance.")(quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)}; 
Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421 (noting both Lopez and Morrison sought to maintain 
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suggested in dicta that the Corps' regulation of such wetlands raised 
serious constitutional questions because states and ~ocal govern-
ments had traditionally regulated isolated, non-navigable intrastate 
waters.147 Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires all persons 
to obtain a permit from the Corps "for the discharge of dredged or 
fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites."148 
The Act defines the crucial term "navigable waters" to "mean[] the 
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."149 Both 
the EPA and Corps have issued regulations broadly defining the 
term "waters of the United States" to include "intrastate lakes, 
rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, 
sandfiats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa 
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which 
could affect interstate or foreign commerce .... "150 
In 1985, in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,151 the 
Supreme Court held that the Corps had jurisdiction over non-
navigable wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters.152 The 
Court concluded that jurisdiction existed both because there was 
evidence that Congress intended to give the Corps authority over 
adjacent wetlands and because such wetlands often have a signifi-
cant impact on navigable wetlands.15s However, the Riverside 
Bayview Court did not decide whether the Corps could regulate 
isolated, intrastate wetlands or waters that are clearly not adjacent 
to navigable waters. 
There are sound ecological reasons to protect isolated intrastate 
wetlands. They are home to many birds and other wetland species, 
distinction between national and local power); Johnson, supra note 14, at 10673 (stating broad 
reading of Migratory Bird Act would impede on traditional state power). 
147 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172·74. 
148 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994). 
149 10.. § 1362(7). 
1150 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001) (Corps regulation); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (2001) (EPA 
regulation); Funk, supra note 14, at 10741. 
151 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
152 1d. at 132.35. 
153 See id. at 129·35 (finding legislative history and policy support Corps' definition of 
wetlands); Funk, supra note 14, at 10742·44 (discussing RiversideBayview Homes); Johnson, 
supra note 14, at 10672 (arguing Riverside Bayview Homes allowed regulation of many waters 
and wetlands that are not navigable in fact). See also Johnson, supra at 10674·75 (discussing 
nexus standard for relationship between adjacent wetlands and navigable waters). 
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and they often serve as a buffer against local flooding. 154 In 1986, 
the Corps issued a regulation claiming to extend its jurisdiction to 
isolated, intrastate wetlands or waters that are not adjacent to 
navigable waters "based on their actual or potential use as habitat 
for migratory birds."155 The so-called "Migratory Bird Rule" stated 
that "waters ofthe United States ... also include ... waters [w]hich 
are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird 
Treaties; or [w]hich are or would be used as habitat by other 
migratory birds which cross state lines."156 The regulation was 
based on the premise that the destruction of isolated, intrastate 
wetlands would reduce the suitable habitat for migratory birds, and 
in turn, the death of many birds from the destruction of these 
wetlands would in theory reduce interstate commerce in 
birdwatching and bird hunting.157 
Resolving a conflict in the circuit courts,158 the SWANCC Court 
held that the migratory bird regulation was invalid because 
Congress did not intend to include "isolated" wetlands or waters 
within the term "navigable waters," when it enacted the Clear 
Water Act. 159 In dicta, the SW ANCC Court indicated that regulation 
of isolated intrastate wetlands would raise serious questions under 
the Commerce Clause because local land use regulation is a 
traditional state and local function. 160 While previous cases had 
stated that migratory bird protection was a "national interest of 
very nearly the first magnitude,"161 the Court found it was "not 
I~ See Johnson, supra note 14, at 10670·71 (discussing benefits of isolated wetlands and 
impact of SWANCC). 
155 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,216, 
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320·30); Funk, supra note 14, at 10741; 
Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 193·94. 
ISS Final Rule for Regulatory Programs for the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217. 
157 Id.; Funk, supra note 14, at 10741; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 193·94. 
158 Compare Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256,262·63 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding 
regulation of isolated, intrastate wetlands constitutional under Commerce Clause), and Leslie 
Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding regulation to be 
constitutional), with United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251,257 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding Corps' 
regulation of isolated intrastate wetlands is unconstitutional under Commerce Clause). 
159 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(a), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) 
(1994); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162·63 (2001); 
Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 194. 
160 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172·74; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195. 
161 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 
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clear" whether the regulated activity or object, in the aggregate, 
affects interstate commerce.162 The Court observed that the Clean 
Water Act preserves significant local control over water resources 
and land use issues.163 According to the Court, the Clean Water Act 
does not "express [ ] a desire to readjust the federal-state balance in 
this manner, but instead by enacting the statute Congress chose to 
'recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States ... to plan the development and use ... ofland and 
water resources ... .' ,,164 
Because there was no clear statement in the Act indicatmg that 
Congress wished to give the federal government authority over 
isolated wetlands, the Court refused to broadly interpret the Act to 
include "federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within 
the 'Migratory Bird Rule' [that] would result in a significant 
impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land 
and water use."165 Accordingly, the Court "read the statute as 
written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism 
questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and therefore 
rejected the request for administrative deference."166 The actual 
impact of the SWANGC opinion remains uncertain because the line 
between isolated, purely intrastate wetlands and those wetlands 
that are adjacent to navigable waters is often unclear and depends 
in part how the Corps and the EPA define the term "wetlands" and 
"navigable waters."167 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the 
majority should have deferred to the Corps' reasonable interpreta-
tion of the term "navigable waters" in the Clean Water Act to 
(1920». 
162 Id. at 173; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195. 
163 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166·67 (noting Clean Water Act preserved "primary 
responsibilities and rights of the state to prevent, reduce and eliminate water pollution [and] 
to plan the development and use ..• of land and water resources"); Moiseyev, supra note 14, 
at 195. 
164 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174 (quoting Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) 
(1994». 
16:1 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 See Funk, supra note 14, at 10743·45, 10771-72 (arguing future of wetlands regulation 
is uncertain because definition of adjacent wetland is not clear); Johnson, supra note 14, at 
10676-77 (discussing uncertainty for future of wetland regulation). 
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include isolated intrastate wetlands. 16B Additionally, Justice 
Stevens contended that Congress may regulate isolated wetlands 
inhabited by migratory birds under the Commerce Clause.169 He 
maintained that regulation of isolated wetlands is proper under the 
Commerce Clause because, in contrast to the local activities 
impermissibly regulated in Lopez and Morrison, "the discharge offill 
material into the Nation's waters is almost always undertaken for 
economic reasons.,,170 Justice Stevens further argued that the 
destruction of isolated wetlands substantially affects interstate 
commerce because it significantly harms the migratory bird 
population in the aggregate and reduces tourism 171 and that "the 
causal connection between the filling of wetlands and the decline of 
commercial activities associated with migratory birds is not 'attenu-
ated,' ,,172 but instead "is direct and concrete."I73 Furthermore, 
Justice Stevens contended that the Migratory Bird Rule did not blur 
the line between national and local activities because the protection 
of migratory birds is a national problem that has traditionally been 
a federal responsibility.174 Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded 
that regulation of intrastate isolated wetlands could be sustained 
under the Commerce Clause solely because of its impact on 
interstate migratory birds. 175 
168 See Solid WasteAgency, 531 U.S. at 175·92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (givingjustification 
for Corps interpretation of "navigable waters"); see also Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 195 
(describing Corp's reasoning for their definition of navigable waters). Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg and Breyer joined the dissent. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174. 
169 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 192·97 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note 
14, at 196. 
170 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note 14, 
at 196. 
171 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 192·95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note 
14, at 196. 
172 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612); Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 196. 
173 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbs v. Babbitt, 
214 F.3d 483, 492·93 (4th Cir. 2000»; Moiseyev, supra note 14, at 196. 
174 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 195·97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
175 ld. 
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F. DOES IT MATTER WHETHER A SPECIES IS INTRASTATE? 
Professor Nagle has "questioned the significance of whether a 
species is purely intrastate or may cross state lines in determining 
whether the species substantially affects interstate commerce. He 
asks, "Why the fact that a bird or animal crosses state lines of its 
own volition and without being itself an object of interstate com-
merce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains unex-
plained.,,176 For example, what is the constitutional significance of 
whether the TIlinois Cave Amphipod lives only in caves in Illinois 
instead of living in a couple of caves in Missouri as well?177 
Similarly, in Cargill, Inc. v. United States,178 Justice Thomas, 
dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari, stated that the 
assumption that "the self- propelled flight of birds across state lines 
creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion 
of jurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a habitat 
for inigratory birds ... likely stretches Congress' Commerce Clause 
powers beyond the breaking point."179 In SWANGG, the Court did 
not directly address whether the presence of migratory birds was 
sufficient to justify regulation of intrastate, isolated wetlands under 
the Commerce Clause, but it stated that such argument "raise[d] 
significant constitutional questions[;] [fjor example, we would have 
to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce."180 While dicta, this 
portion of SWANCC suggests that the fact that a species crosses 
state lines does not automatically make its habitat entitled to 
protection under the Commerce Clause without further analysis 
regarding the relationship of the habitat to the species and commer-
cial activity. 
176 Nagle, supra note 8, at 185 n.49. 
177 See Final Rule to List the Illinois Cave Ampbipod as Endangered, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,900, 
46,902 (Sept. 3, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2001» (listing issue 1 as: "The Federal 
Government ... does not have the authority to list a species found in only one state, because 
regulation of such species does not impact upon interstate commerce."); Nagle, supra note 8, 
at 182·83 (stating there is already litigation about whether Illinois Cave Ampbipod affects 
interstate commerce). 
178 516 U.S. 955 (1995). 
179 Id. at 958. 
ISO Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173. 
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Professor Nagle acknowledges that most judges and commenta-
tors have assumed that purely intrastate species raise greater 
constitutional concerns under the Commerce Clause than those that 
travel interstate. 181 As is discussed in Part IV.A, in National Ass'n 
of Home Builders v. Babbitt ("Home Builders"),182 a three-judge 
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
appeared to attach significance to the fact that the endangered 
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly was a purely intrastate species.183 
Remember that in Wickard, the fact that the wheat was grown 
solely in one state did not prevent the Court from finding that the 
federal government could regulate intrastate activities that affect 
interstate commerce.184 · It is significant that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in Lopez remarked on the extraordinary breadth of 
Wickard precisely because the intrastate nature of the activity 
involved in the case has made it a landmark for establishing the 
outer limits of the Commerce Clause.185 Before 1937, the Supreme 
Court often distinguished interstate commerce from intrastate 
manufacturing activities that it viewed as beyond the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.18s Thus, courts have treated whether an activity 
is intrastate as an important factor,187 although Professor Nagle 
may well be correct that they have exaggerated its significance. 
Whether a species is located in one state should be a factor, but 
not dispositive, in deciding whether it substantially affects inter-
state commerce. Wickard establishes that intrastate activities can 
181 Nagle, supra note 8, at 185 nA9. 
182 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
183 See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text (explaining Congress was allowed to 
prohibit private taking of Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly under Commerce Clause even 
though it existed in only one state). 
184 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942). 
185 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (calling Wickard "perhaps the most 
far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity"). 
186 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,276-77 (1918) (holding Commerce Clause did 
not authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not interstate commerce 
even though products later entered interstate commerce), overruled by United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) 
(holding sugar manufacturers were outside Sherman Act because sugar manufacturing was 
intrastate activity even if sugar later entered interstate commerce). 
187 For example, the Supreme Court in Lopez rejected congressional regulation of 
intrastate possession of a gun, but undoubtedly would have approved legislation prohibiting 
interstate transport of that same gun. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-67. 
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affect interstate commerce sufficiently to fall within the ambit of the 
Commerce Clause. 188 On the other hand, the fact that a speqies 
crosses interstate lines or is located in more than one state does not 
automatically mean that it has significant commercial value. The 
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly has little immediate commercial 
value whether it is located in one state or two, or whether it 
occasionally flies across state borders.189 Nevertheless, whether a 
species crosses state boundaries has been an,d should be a factor in 
evaluating whether it affects interstate commerce. For example, 
whether a species crosses state boundaries may affect the extent to 
which it is an object of tourism, affects agriculture, or contributes to 
biodiversity.19o As discussed below, whether a species crosses state 
lines could be a factor when courts addrEilss such issues as whether 
Congress has the authority to regulate destructive competition 
among states or to aggregate species together in determining 
whether they affect" interstate commerce.191 
Regardless of whether an endangered species is located in one 
state is an important distinction, there is still the issue of whether 
the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to protect the many 
endangered and threatened species that lack immediate commercial 
value. To what extent may Congress consider a species potential 
medical or genetic benefits? Is it appropriate to aggregate commer-
cially valuable species with those that have little value? 
188 Wickard, 317 U.S. 111 at 123-30. 
189 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 182-83 (arguing many endangered species lack any 
commercial value). 
190 Apparently intrastate species may have significant economic impacts, but all things 
being equal, an interstate species can potentially affect a wider range of people and other 
animals. For example, in Gibbs 11. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub 
nom., Gibbs 11. Norron, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001), the court discussed the wide-ranging economic 
and commercial impacts of red wolves. See generally infra notes 261-95 (discussing Gibbs 11. 
Babbitt). 
191 See generally infra notes 375-438 and accompanying text (discussing argument in favor 
of aggregation). 
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IV. LOWER COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ESA: GIBBS AND 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS 
Despite the Supreme Court's recent trend to narrow the scope of 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, both the 
Fourth and the District of Columbia Circuits have held that 
Congress may regulate intrastate species under the ESA. Both 
circuits relied on congressional findings that protecting endangered 
species may have a significant effect on preserving genetic and 
biodiversity resources in concluding that protecting intrastate 
species is significant economic activity encompassed by the Com-
merce Clause. However, in light of Morrison and SWANCC, there 
is a serious question whether Congress may regulate intrastate 
endangered species that currently generate little or no interstate 
commerce. There are also serious questions about whether federal 
regulation of intrastate endangered species impermissibly intrudes 
on traditional state and local control over land usage. 
A. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOMEBUILDERS 
In National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt,192 by a fractured 
two-to-one decision, the D.C. Circuit held that Congress had 
authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the private taking 
of an endangered species that existed in only one state and did not 
directly generate any significant interstate commerce.193 As a result 
of commercial development and pollution, the habitat of the Delhi 
Sands Flower-Loving Fly ("the fly") was apparently limited to a 
forty-square-mile area entirely within the state of California.194 
There was no significant interstate trade in or transportation ofthe 
fly.195 The construction of roads to a proposed hospital would have 
destroyed most of the fly's habitat and possibly the entire population 
of the endangered fly.196 The Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") 
192 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
193 Id. at 1046-49. 
194 Id. at 1043-44. 
195 Id.; Brignac, supra note 10, at 884. 
196 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1044-45. 
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determined that the proposed road construction was a "taking" of 
endangered species under section 9(a)(1).197 The developers argued 
that the federal government did not have the authority under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate the use of private lands to protect the 
fly because it is found only within a single state.198 They contended 
that "the Constitution of the United States does not grant the 
federal government the authority to regulate wildlife, nor does it 
authorize federal regulation of non-federallands."199 
1. Judge Wald's Opinion. By a two-to-one vote, Home Builders 
upheld the constitutionality of the ESA as applied to the fly,200 but 
the two judges in the majority disagreed about the grounds for 
finding authority under the Commerce Power. In her opinion, Judge 
Wald argued that the ESA was constitutional under the first and 
. third categories of interstate regulation outlined in Lopez: "chan-
nels of commerce" and activity "substantially affecting" interstate 
commerce.201 Initially, she concluded that section 9(a)(1)'s prohibi-
tion against "takings" of endangered spec~es meets the first prong 
of the Lopez test-whether an activity affected the "channels of 
interstate commerce" through an extension of the Wickard aggrega-
tion rule. According to Judge Wald, "we may look not only to the 
effect of the extinction of the individual endangered species at issue 
in this case, but also to the aggregate effect of the extinction of all 
similarly situated endangered species.,,202 Judge Wald argued that 
the prohibition against taking endangered species is necessary to 
achieve the government's regulation of transportation of endangered 
species.20s Like laws forbidding the transfer and possession of 
machine guns, the takings prohibition was necessary to control 
interstate trafficking of endangered species.204 The takings 
prohibition was within Congress' authority to "keep the channels of 
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses," akin to 
197 Id. at 1044. 
198 Id. at 1045. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 1057 (holding regulation offly is constitutional under Commerce Clause). 
201 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046; Scalera, supra note 6, at 337. 
202 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046. 
203 Id. 
2(U Id. at 1047; Scalera, supra note 6, at 337. 
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other prohibited noxious or harmful behaviors, such as racial 
discrimination and unfair labor practices.205 
Judge Wald also concluded that the takings prohibition in the 
ESA meets Lopezs third prong-activities that have substantial 
impacts on interstate commerce.206 Judge Wald interpreted the 
prong to include commercial or noncommercial activities alike,207 
although some would question whether the Lopez Court was as 
willing to so readily include noneconomic impacts.208 She deferred 
to congressional findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative history about 
the value of biodiversity and the potential for future medical uses 
from a wide range of endangered species in concluding that "takings 
[of endangered species] ... would have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of access to an 
important natural resource-biodiversity."209 By preserving 
biodiversity, the ESA produces significant current .and future 
economic benefits to interstate commerce by preserving genetic 
diversity and conserving genetic resources that may have future 
medical value.210 
Judge Wald concluded that, each time a species becomes extinct 
and the pool of wild species decreases, the extinction "has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a natural 
resource that could otherwise be used for present and future 
commercial purpose.,,211 She acknowledged that the full value of 
many plants and animals is uncertain but nonetheless concluded 
that each endangered species is entitled to protection because "[a] 
species whose worth is still unmeasured has what economists call 
2Il6 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 214, 246 (1964) (upholding use of Commerce Power to enact civil rights 
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations), United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1941) (upholding use of Commerce Power to enact legislation 
requiring employers to adopt minimum wage and maximum hour limitations»; Scalero, supra 
note 6, at 337-38. 
206 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1049. 
2IJ7 Id. 
208 See Linehan, supra note 21, at 421-22 (arguing Judge Wald's broad approach to 
evaluating noncommercial impact such as biodiversity was more consistent with Justices 
Breyer and Souter's dissenting opinions in Lopez than majority opinion). 
208 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-54; Scalero, supra note 6, at 338. 
210 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-53. 
211 Id. at 1053. 
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an 'option value'-the value of the possibility that a future discovery 
will make useful a species that is currently thought of as useless."212 
She continued, "To allow even a single species whose value is not 
currently apparent to become extinct therefore deprives the economy 
of the option value of that species.,,213 In the aggregate, she 
concluded, the extinction of endangered species had a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.214 
However, there are serious problems with Judge Wald's aggrega-
tion of all endangered and threatened species in assessing whether: 
a particular endangered species has a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce. By aggregating the benefits of all endangered 
species, Judge Wald could defend the protection of any endangered 
species no matter how attenuated its relationship to interstate 
commerce.215 In particular, Judge Wald used the" aggregation 
approach to justify preservation of an isolated fly population without 
having to demonstrate that the species has any economic value now 
or is likely to in the future.216 Such aggregation is arguably 
appropriate only if there is a significant relationship among 
different endangered species, resulting in their having a substantial 
cumulative impact on interstate commerce, although less significant 
impacts satisfy the requirement if they cannot be easily separated 
from a comprehensive scheme essential to the promotion of com-
merce.217 As discussed in Part VI, a possible justification for a broad 
aggregation principle for all endangered and threatened species 
would be deference to congressional findings in the ESA's legislative 
history.218 
212 Id. (citing Bryan Nolan, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of 
Quantification in Valuing Biodiveristy, in BIODIVERSITY 200, 202 (Edward O. Wilson ed., 
1988». 
213 Id. 
21. Id. at 1053.54. 
215 See Akins, supra note 45, at 180·81 (concluding "connection between the regulated 
activity and interstate commerce is too attenuated"). 
216 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 183·84. 
217 See infra notes 433·38 and accompanying text (discussing implications of aggregation 
if broader regulatory scheme). 
218 See infra notes 415·28 and accompanying text (discussing need for deference to 
congressional finding). 
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Judge Wald also argued that Congress has the power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate destructive economic competition.219 
Accordingly, she concluded that Congress could regulate intrastate 
endangered species if economic competition among states was likely 
to prevent them from providing adequate protection to such 
species.220 The issue of when Congress may regulate activities to 
prevent a "race to the bottom" by competing states will be discussed 
below in Part V.B.221 
2. Judge Henderson's Concurring Opinion. Concurring with the 
court's judgment, Judge Henderson agreed with Judge Wald that 
the taking prohibition in section 9(a)(1) of the ESA is valid under 
the Commerce Clause.222 However, Judge Henderson reached her 
conclusion by a somewhat different reasoning process. First, she 
disagreed with Judge Wald's claim that the statute regulates 
channels of commerce because endangered species, unlike machine 
guns or lumber, are not commercially marketable goods.223 Second, 
Judge Henderson questioned whether the ESA's protection of 
biodiversity would have a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce because of the loss of potential medical or economic benefit.224 
She criticized Judge Wald's biodiversity theory because the medical 
and economic benefits of preserving biodiversity are too speculative 
to meet Lopezs substantial effect on interstate commerce test.225 
In concluding that the Commerce Clause reached the FWS' 
regulation of the fly, Judge Henderson determined that "the loss of 
biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and 
likewise on interstate commerce.,,226 She contended that "[given] the 
interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the extinction of one species affects others and their 
ecosystems and that the protection of a purely intrastate species ... 
will therefore substantially affect land and objects that are involved 
219 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054-57. 
220 [d. 
221 See infra notes 340·56 and accompanying text. 
222 [d. at 1057 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
223 [d. at 1057.58. 
22' [d. at 1058. 
22.1 [d. 
226 [d. at 1058-59. 
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in interstate commerce."227 Accordingly, she maintained that there 
is a rational basis to believe that the taking of an endangered 
species substantially affects interstate commerce and that section 
9(a)(1) is within the commerce power of Congress.228 However, 
Judge Henderson presented no evidence about how the extinction of 
the fly might affect other species or interstate commerce. 
Alternatively, Judge Henderson concluded that the destructive 
impact of the hospital construction on the fly's habitat substantially 
affected interstate commerce.229 By requiring consideration of how 
such construction will affect endangered species like the fly, the 
ESA "relates to both the proposed redesigned traffic intersection and 
the hospital it is intended to serve, each of which has an obvious 
connection with interstate commerce."230 Thus, even if the fly itself 
is not in interstate commerce, the hospital construction is clearly a 
commercial activity that directly affects the habitat of the fly. 
Arguably, the relationship between the construction of the hospital 
and the destruction of the fly's habitat is relatively,direct and should 
be enough to bring the protection of the fly within the Commerce 
Clause.231 
3. Judge Sentelle's Dissenting Opinion. In his dissent, Judge 
Sentelle contended that section 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESAis unconstitu-
tional under Lope~s three-part standard because the statute does 
not regulate commerce.232 Evaluated under Lope~s first prong, the 
ESA does not affect use of the channels of interstate commerce 
because the fly does not engage in interstate trave1.233 Considering 
the second prong of Lopez, whether a regulation governs found "the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce," Judge Sentelle found the 
ESA deficient because it does not control a commercial activity.234 
227 Id. at 1059. 
228 Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 557·59 (1995». 
229 Id. 
230 Id. See also Linehan, supra note 21, at 422·24 (arguing Commerce Clause does not 
encompass protection of noncommercial activities such as protection of fly simply because 
there is some connection to commercial enterprise). 
231 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 189·91, 208-14 (discussing choice of activity problem, 
whether focus should be on fly's impact on interstate commerce or hospital construction's 
impact). 
232 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1061-62 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
233 Id. at 1063. 
2M Id. at 1062. 
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Further, as a secondary matter, the ESA contains no jurisdictional 
provision limiting it scope to regulate only activities affecting 
interstate commerce.235 Under Lopezs third prong, whether an 
activity has substantial effects on interstate commerce, Judge 
Sentelle agreed with Judge Henderson's concurrence, concluding 
that Judge Wald's argument about the potential medical value of 
protecting biodiversity is too speculative to support congressional 
regulation under the Commerce Clause.236 
Judge Sentelle also argued that Judge Henderson's ecosystem 
argument was too far removed from commerce in light of the 
Supreme Court's requirement in Lopez that regulation must 
substantially affect commercial concerns.237 According to Judge 
Sentelle, if there was a sufficient connection between the hospital 
construction's involvement with articles of commerce and the 
incidental result of the construction destroying the fly's habitat 
there no "stopping point" in defining the Commerce 
Power-Congress could regulate any noncommercial activity that 
has some impact on or is affected in some way by articles in 
interstate commerce.238 Thus, the fly was simply not an article in 
interstate commerce and, therefore, not within the Commerce 
Power.239 
4. Is Home Builders Consistent with Lopez, Morrison and 
SW ANCC? The Home Builders case was decided after Lopez, but 
before Morrison and SWANCC. Judge Sentelle clearly believed that 
the majority's decision was inconsistent with both the spirit and 
letter of Lopez. 240 The subsequent Morrison and SW ANCC decisions 
do not explicitly resolve the questions at issue in Home Builders. It 
is likely that Judge Wald and Judge Henderson would reach the 
same conclusions even in light of Morrison and SWANCC. Never-
theless, Morrison and SWANCC raise additional doubts about 
whether Judge Wald and Judge Henderson's opinions are consistent 
235 Id. at 1064.65. 
23S Id. at 1065. 
237 Id. See also Linehan. supra note 21. at 424 (advancing same argument). 
238 Home Builders. 130 F.3d at 1063. 1067 (Sentelle. J .• dissenting). 
239 Id. 
2~ Id. 
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with the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the Commerce Power 
and protectiveness toward traditional state authority. 
While many endangered species have significant impacts on 
interstate commerce, the rejection in Morrison of the aggregation of 
noneconomic activities raises concerns about Judge Wald's argu-
ment that it is appropriate to aggregate together the benefit of 
preserving all endangered species in determining their present and 
future value to the national economy.241 IT a court must examine the 
interstate commercial value of the fly alone, it is more difficult to 
demonstrate a significant effect on interstate commerce. For 
example, in SWANCC, the Court of Appeals found that protection 
of migratory birds had a substantial impact on commerce because 
"millions of people spend over a billion dollars annually on recre-
ational pursuits relating to migratory birds.,,242 However, the 
Supreme Court concluded that arguments about the value of 
preserving isolated wetlands to protect migratory birds raised 
"significant constitutional questions" and that "we would have to 
evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce."243 While its reasoning 
is based on statutory and not constitutional grounds, the Court's 
concern with the "precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce" might demand more 
precision and detailed justification than Judge Wald's argument. 
For example,Judge Wald never presented evidence of interstate 
trafficking in the fly or showed that it is likely to have medical 
value.244 On the other hand, as discussed in Part VI, Congress had 
a rational basis for its findings in the ESA'slegislative history that 
preserving biodiversity would result in future economic and medical 
benefits.245 
241 Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (rejecting aggregation 
of noneconomic impacts in determining whether activity has substantial impact on economy), 
with Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046, 1053-54 (approving aggregation of impacts from loss 
of large numbers of or all endangered species). 
ro Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001). 
243 ld. 
2« See Scalero, supra note 6, at 337. 
245 See infra notes 394-400, 415-17 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's 
findings). 
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In Lopez, the Court suggested it would have been more willing to 
uphold the GFSZA if the statute contained a "jurisdictional element 
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry," that the activity 
at issue substantially affects interstate commerce.246 While the ESA 
includes congressional findings about the long-term value of 
protecting endangered species, it does not clearly define when the 
protection of endangered species affects interstate commerce.247 
When it enacted the ESA, Congress did not include an explicit 
jurisdictional element limiting its applicability to specific commer-
cial activities.248 Yet Lopez did not hold that a statute must contain 
a jurisdictional element defining the statute's relationship to 
interstate commerce.249 The absence of a jurisdictional element 
leaves for the courts to decide whether the activity in question 
substantially affects interstate commerce. 
Judge Henderson argued that the Commerce Clause applies to 
regulation of the fly because the species would have been substan-
tially affected by the hospital construction, which was clearly a 
commercial activity.250 By contrast, Judge Sentelle argued in 
dissent that any relationship between the hospital's construction 
and its impact in destroying the fly's habitat was too attenuated to 
support federal regulation under the "substantial effects" test 
because there would be no "stopping point" in defining the Com-
merce Power if Congress could regulate any noncommercial activity 
that had some impact on or was affected in some way by articles in 
interstate commerce.251 A key disagreement between Judge 
Henderson and Judge Sentelle in applying the Commerce Clause to 
the facts of the case was whether the focus should be on the 
economic nature of the hospital construction or on the fly's lack of 
246 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
2<7 See White, supra note 6, at 242 (distinguishing ESA from other federal statute which 
limited its scope to specific commercial activities). 
248 See ide (distinguishing ESAfrom Civil Rights legislation which also lacks jurisdictional 
element but applies to readily apparent cases). 
2<9 [d. at 243, 253-54 (suggesting Congress might evade Commerce Clause problems by 
adding jurisdictional limit). 
250 Nat'l ABs'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(Henderson, J., concurring). 
2,0;1 [d. at 1063, 1067 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
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commercial value.252 Depending upon whether one views the 
extinction of the fly as caused by commercial activities or as a 
noncommercial issue because the fly itself is not valuable, one 
reaches different answers about whether protection of the fly 
substantially affects interstate commerce.253 In this regard, consider 
that the Supreme Court in Morrison rejected congressional findings 
that gender-based violence had impacts on interstate commerce 
because the Court viewed gender-based violence as a noneconomic 
activity that had only attenuated impacts on interstate commerce.254 
In Sweet Home, which was decided after Lopez, the Supreme 
Court approved a regulation that prohibited private landowners 
from destroying the critical habitat of endangered species.255 While 
Sweet Home never directly addressed the issue of whether Congress 
had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the ESA, there 
is a strong argument that a regulation that controls development 
activities on private lands that contain critical habitat has a direct 
impact on interstate commerce. In Sweet Home, the respondents 
challenging the prohibition were small landowners, logging 
companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries 
in the Southeast and Pacific Northwest.256 In the concluding 
paragraph of his majority opinion in Sweet Home, Justice Stevens 
asserted that: "the Act encompasses a vast range of economic and 
social enterprises and endeavors.,,257 The respondents were 
undoubtedly engaged in commerce. In the aggregate, all the persons 
affected by the regulation likely had a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce. While Sweet Home never addressed congressional 
authority under the Commerce Power, the Court's approval of 
federal regulation of private lands containing the critical habitat of 
endangered species at least suggests that the Court .may be less 
hostile to federal regulation in this area than it was in Lopez, 
252 See supra notes 232·39 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Sentelle's dissent). 
253 See Nagle, supra note B, at 17B-79, 1B9-91, 20B-14 (discussing whether focus should be 
fly or hospital construction). 
254 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 59B, 615-16 (2000). 
255 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-70B 
(1995). 
256 [d. at 692. 
257 [d. at 70B. 
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Morrison, or SW ANCC. 258 On the other hand, the Court could limit 
the regulation approved in Sweet Home to species that are directly 
involved in interstate commerce. 
Judge Wald and Judge Henderson each offered interesting 
arguments for concluding that regulation of intrastate endangered 
species is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Part VI will 
analyze Judge Wald's argument that courts should defer to congres-
sional findings about the value of preserving biodiversity in more 
depth.259 Judge Henderson's argument that a court should focus on 
whether the commercial development that harms an endangered 
species substantially affects interstate commerce is valuable, and, 
arguably, is implicitly consistent with Sweet Home's approval of 
regulation of private landowners.26o However, her argument is 
incomplete without exarn;n;ngwhether the regulation of commercial 
activities that affect intrastate endangered species interferes with 
traditional state authority over local land use. 
B. GIBBS 
In 2000, immediately after the Supreme Court decided Morrison, 
the Fourth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision by Chief Judge 
Wilkinson, rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA in 
Gibbs v. Babbitt.261 The Gibbs plaintiffs were private landowners 
and municipalities in eastern North Carolina who challenged a FWS 
regulation that prohibited the taking of endangered red wolves on 
private land.262 The Court estimated that there were approximately 
75 red wolves in eastern North Carolina, slightly more than half on 
private land.263 
1. The Majority: Taking Red Wolves Substantially Affects 
Interstate Commerce. While acknowledging that the taking of an 
258 See supra notes 88-191 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 200-20 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Wald's argument). 
2SO See supra notes 222-39 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Henderson's 
argument). 
261 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 
(2001). See generally Dave Owen, Gibbs v. Babbitt, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 377 (2001) (providing 
in-depth review and analysis of case). 
262 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489. 
2S3 [d. at 488. 
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individual wolf may be relatively insignificant, the majority 
concluded that the taking of red wolves in the aggregate implicates 
several commercial activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce as defined in Lopez and Morrison.264 The Court found 
that red wolves are part of a $29.2 billion national wildlife-related 
recreational industry that involves tourism and interstate travel. 265 
In particular, numerous tourists travel to North qarolina from other 
states for ''howling events"--evenings of listening to wolf howls 
accompanied by educational programs.266 Additionally, the protec-
tion of red wolf takings stimulated scientific research that had clear 
economic value.267 Moreover, preservation of red wolves could 
eventually allow a revival of the trade in their fur pelts once 
populations recovered to a sufficient extent.268 The Fourth Circuit's 
holding in Gibbs was sufficient to save ESA regulation of the red 
wold because of the species' peculiar economic value. However, 
many other endangered species have no apparent economic yalue 
and thus benefit little from the reasoning in Gibbs.269 Accordingly, 
this portion of the Gibbs decision is limited to the specific facts 
involving the wolf.270 
The Gibbs court also found that the taking of wolves on private. 
property was directly motivated by the economic interests offarmers 
and ranchers, and that this connection clearly qualified as economic 
under the Commerce Clause.271 This would be so even if some might 
believe that the preservation of wolves is economically harmful 
rather than beneficial:272 
264 ld. at 492·93. See Owen, supra note 261, at 382·83 (noting that "even after Lopez, 
protecting endangered species was within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause"). 
But see Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11336 (questioning whether killing single red wolf is 
commercial or economic activity). 
26S Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493. 
266 ld. 
267 ld. at 493.94. 
268 ld. at 495. 
269 See Brignac, supra note 10, at 883 (describing wolf as "special case" of endangered 
species due to its marketable pelts and tourist-friendly behavior). 
270 See Owen, supra note 261, at 391,398 (arguing Gibbs may have limited precedential 
effect because red wolf has more obvious connection to interstate commerce than many other 
endangered species). 
271 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495. 
~2 ld. But see Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11336 (questioning whether farmer killing red 
wolf to protect livestock or homestead is sufficiently commercial or economic activity under 
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By restricting the taking of red wolves, § 17.84(c) is 
said to impede economic development and commercial 
activities such as ranching and farming. This effect 
on commerce, however, still qualifies as a legitimate 
subject for regulation. The regulation here targets 
takings that are economically motivated, in that 
farmers take wolves to protect valuable livestock and 
crops.273 
Thus, the Commerce Power encompasses a regulation preserving 
the red wolves not only because the red wolf itself has economic 
value but also because the regulation of the wolf has a direct impact 
on ranching and farming activities that are clearly a part of 
interstate commerce.274 
Furthermore, the Gibbs majority echoed Judge Wald in arguing 
that courts should defer to congressional findings about the future 
value of endangered species even if those benefits could not be 
precisely calculated.275 The court noted that the Supreme Court has 
traditionally deferred to congressional findings that regulation may 
produce economic or other benefits in the future as long as there is 
a rational basis for such legislative findings.276 Accordingly, 
Congress may protect an endangered species because it might have 
a significant economic effect in the future even if it has no present 
value or effect.277 
In response to the dissent's argument that the taking of a few red 
wolves did not have a substantial impact on commerce, the majority 
concluded that it was appropriate to consider the impact of the 
entire regulatory scheme on interstate commerce because the 
regulation was part ora comprehensive statute seeking to preserve 
the species as a whole.278 Because the regulation of red wolves is 
primarily an economic issue,279 the court concluded it was proper, 
Lopez). 
273 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 495. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 496. 
276 Id. at 496.97. 
277 Id. at 496. 
278 Id. at 497.98. 
279 Id. at 493. The Court observed: 
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unlike the aggregation of noneconomic activities rejected in Lopez 
or Morrison, for Congress to aggregate the total impact of taking all 
wolves in determining that such takings could substantially affect 
interstate commerce for Commerce Clause purposes: 
Because the taking of red wolves can be seen as 
economic activity in the sense considered by Lopez 
and Morrison, the individual takings may be aggre-
gated for the purpose of Commerce Clause analysis. 
While the taking of one red wolf on private land may 
not be "substantial," the takings of red wolves in the 
aggregate have a sufficient impact on interstate 
commerce to uphold this regulation. This is espe-
cially so where, as here; the regulation is but one part 
of the broader scheme of endangered species legisla-
tion.280 
Furthermore, if Congress has the authority to enact a compre-
hensive scheme for preserving endangered species,281 courts should 
not invalidate individual regulations because a particular popula-
tion is relatively small.282 In Hodel v. Indiana,283 the Supreme Court 
stated: 
A complex regulatory program . can survive a 
Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that 
every single facet of the program is independently 
and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It 
is enough that the challenged provisions are an 
While the regulation might also reflect a moral judgment concerning the 
importance of rehabilitating endangered species, this does not undermine 
the economic basis for the regulation. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, • . . ("Congress was not restricted by the fact that the 
particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing 
was also deemed a moral and social wrong."). 
Id. at 493 n.2. 
2BO Id. at 493 (citations omitted). 
281 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 699 
(1995) (endorsing Congress's broad purposes behind ESA). 
282 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497.98. 
283 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
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integral part of the regulatory program and that the 
regulatory scheme when considered as a whole 
satisfies this test.284 
Even the Lopez Court acknowledged that Congress may regulate 
intrastate activities that lack substantial commercial value if they 
are an "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, 
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated."285 Otherwise, the Gibbs court 
noted, Congress would lack the power to protect the most endan-
gered species simply because "there are too few animals left to make 
a commercial difference.,,286 According to the Gibbs court, such a 
narrow interpretation of the Commerce Power based solely on the 
number of animals at issue would· "eviscerate the comprehensive 
federal scheme for conserving endangered species and turn congres-
sional judgment on its head."287 
2. Judge Luttig's Dissenting Opinion. Judge Luttig's dissent 
argued that the FWS regulation was unconstitutional under Lopez 
and Morrison's interpretation of the Commerce Power because the 
taking of a handful of red wolves on private property did not come 
close to constituting a significant economic activity under the 
Commerce Clause.288 He criticized the majority decision for failing 
to follow the relatively narrow definitions of economic activity and 
interstate commerce used in both cases.289 Judge Luttig implied 
that regulations protecting endangered species would more likely be 
constitutional if the ESA contained an express interstate jurisdic-
tional requirement limiting its scope to interstate commercial 
activities such as trade or transportation in pelts or animals.290 
Judge Luttig suggested that the majority's affinity to approve 
environmental regulations had led it to misapply the Supreme 
2M Id. at 329 n.17. 
285 Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995); Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11335. 
28S Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting); see also Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 73, at 968-74 
(arguing majority decision in Gibbs is inconsistent with Supreme Court's holding in 
Morrison). 
289 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507-08 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
290 Id. at 508. 
2002] ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 769 
Court's new definition of what constitutes substantial interstate 
commerce: "The affirmative reach and the negative limits of the 
Commerce Clause do not wax and wane depending upon the subject 
matter of the particular legislation under challenge.,,291 
3. Is Gibbs Consistent with SW ANCC? On first impression, the 
Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC casts considerable doubt over 
Gibbs. SW ANCC suggested in dicta that it is not clear whether the 
filling of isolated intrastate wetlands, an activity that affects large 
numbers of migratory birds, is within the Commerce Power.292 It is 
likely that the commercial value of the migratory birds is greater 
than the few dozen red wolves resident on private property in Gibbs. 
However, despite the economic differences, an argument that the 
regulation of red wolves affects interstate commerce is stronger than 
an argument that isolated intrastate wetlands are within the 
jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause. The ESA regulates animals 
that are frequently directly involved in interstate commerce through 
transportation, tourism, trade in pelts, and harms or benefits to 
agriculture.293 By contrast, isolated intrastate wetlands by them-
selves do not necessarily affect interstate commerce.294 Their 
preservation may indirectly affect migratory birds; however, this 
has not been conclusively established. In fact, there are some 
questions about to what extent the destruction of isolated, intrastate 
wetlands would harm migratory birds because not all intrastate 
wetlands would be destroyed, and wetlands in or adjacent to 
navigable waters would retain protection.295 It is the birds, not the 
wetlands themselves, that are most directly connec,ted to interstate 
commerce. 
291 Id. at 510. 
m Solid Waste Agency v. United States Atmy Corps. of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172·74 
(2001). 
293 See supra notes 264-74 (discussing transportation, tourism, trade in pelts and effects 
on agriculture resulting from protection of Red Wolves). 
:m See Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post·Lopez World: 
Some Questions and Answers, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10980, 10988 (News & 
Analysis) (Nov. 2000) ("The isolated wetland in SWANCC is at least a few steps removed from 
interstate commerce."). 
295 See Anna Johnson Cramer, Note, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: An 
Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 V AND. L. REv. 271, 305 (2000) 
(illustrating tenuous link between wetland regulation and commercial effects of migratory 
birds); Linehan, supra note 21, at 418·19 (same). 
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One may disagree with the SWANCC majority that the connec-
tion between the wetlands and birds is too remote, but the wetlands 
are only indirectly implicated in commerce, unlike many endangered 
species that directly affect interstate commerce. Accordingly, 
SW ANCC s analysis does not necessarily portend that the Supreme 
Court will conclude the ESA does not substantially affect interstate 
commerce. Nonetheless, even if the Gibbs Court correctly concluded 
that the red wolves in eastern North Carolina substantially affect 
interstate commerce, will courts apply the same analysis to all 
endangered species, including those that currently have little or no 
apparent value? 
v. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAs A SPECIAL ROLE IN 
CONSERVING WILDLIFE 
The Gibbs majority determined that regulation of endangered 
species is consistent with the federal government's historic role in 
conserving natural resources: "Invalidating this provision would 
call into question the historic power of the federal government to 
preserve scarce resources in one locality for the future benefit of all 
Americans."296 Accordingly, the Gibbs majority concluded that 
federal regulation of endangered species does not intrude on 
traditional state authority, unlike the statutes invalidated in Lopez 
and Morrison. 297 This Part examines whether the argument in 
Gibbs, that regulation of endangered species is primarily a federal 
activity, is still valid in light of SWANCCs statement that land use 
regulation is a traditionally local concern.298 
A. TRADITIONAL STATE ACTIVITIES: WHERE IS THE LINE? 
In Lopez, the Court emphasized that it would carefully review 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause whenever 
federal legislation attempted to regulate areas traditionally 
29G Gibbs, 214 F.3d 483 at 492. 
297 Id. 
298 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174. 
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controlled by state or local governments.299 The Court suggested 
that areas traditionally within the state's regulatory control 
included matters "such as criminal law enforcement or education 
where States ~storically have been sovereign."soo Similarly, in his 
concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that courts 
should be hesitant in allowing Congress to use the Commerce Power 
as the basis for federal regulation in an "area of traditional state 
concern" that "States lay claim by right of history and expertise."SOl 
He maintained, with such an expansive definition of the Commerce 
Power, "the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state 
authority would blur and political responsibility would become 
illusory ."S02 
Both Morrison and SWANCC were concerned that an expansive 
interpretation of congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause could erode federalism by sanctioning legislation that 
excessively intruded on traditional areas of state authority. In 
Morrison, the Court stated that it was inappropriate for courts to 
aggregate noneconomic activities traditionally regulated by states 
for purposes of deciding whether they substantially affect interstate 
commerce because such an approach would "completely obliterate 
the Constitution's distinction between national and local 
authority."s03 The SWANCC Court rejected the Corps interpretation 
of the Clean Water Act to include regulation of intrastate isolated 
wetlands because an interpretation that extended beyond tradi-
tional federal jurisdiction over navigable waters would "alter[] the 
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon 
a traditional state power."S04 
There is a strong argument that the Lopez, Morrison and 
SWANCC decisions underestimated the difficulties in defining the 
299 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); accord United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,619·20 (2000) ("The Constitutionreqmres a distinction between what 
is truly national and what is truly local.,,). j 
300 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67. 
301 Id. at 580, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
302 Id. at 577. 
303 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
3G( Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) 
("[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly 
changed the federal·state balance") (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971». 
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limits of traditional state authority.305 In his dissenting opinion in 
Morrison, Justice Souter asserted that the majority's efforts to 
preserve a sphere of state interests separate from the national 
government was doomed to fail just as the similar effort to protect 
"traditional government function" from federal regulation in 
National League of Cities v. Usery806 had been subsequently 
overruled as unworkable in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 307 because the line between state and federal 
authority was too hard to define. a08 Furthermore, the contours of 
federalism, the balance of state and federal powers, have clearly 
changed since 1789.809 If change is the norm in federalism, what is 
a traditional state activity? 
The Supreme Court should return to the more deferential 
standard of rational basis review that it used before Lopez in 
determining whether congressional legislation impermissibly 
interferes with areas of traditional state regulation. In his Morrison 
dissent, Justice Souter correctly argued that "politics, not judicial 
review, should mediate between state and national interests."310 
Nevertheless, regardless of the difficulties in defining traditional 
state authority, regulation of endangered species is not a traditional 
state function even under the inappropriately stringent approach 
used in Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC. 
306 See Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421·22 (assailing such standards as "too 
imprecise to provide any sort of basis for a credible and predictable limitation on congressio· 
nal power."); Johnson, supra note 6, at 53·54 (predicting that such standards "will likely 
result in inconsistent and irreconcilable decisions."). 
30S 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
307 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
308 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 645·46 (Souter, J. dissenting) (arguing effort to define traditional 
government function for purposes of Tenth Amendment had failed and similar efforts to 
ciefine traditional state functions for purposes of commerce power are likewise likely to fail); 
see also Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421·22 (reiterating Justice Souter's argument); 
Johnson, supra note 6, at 53·54 (same); Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 73, at 943·45 (same). 
S09 Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court substantially expanded the breadth of the 
Commerce Clause and, thereby expanded federal authority at the expense of states. See 
supra notes 72·87 and accompanying text. 
310 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647; Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10421·22. 
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B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO PROTECT 
SCARCE NATURAt RESOURCES 
While SWANCC suggested that land use regulation is a tradition-
ally local concern,311 in fact, there is concurrent or overlapping 
federal and state regulation over private land and wildlife manage-
ment in various contexts.312 Although states and local governments 
possess broad regulatory and zoning authority over land within 
their jurisdictions,313 numerous cases have held that Congress can 
regulate even private land use for environmental and wildlife 
conservation.314 Since 1900, Congress has enacted a number of 
statutes preserving endangered wildlife regulation,315 which 
strongly suggests that the conservation of scarce natural resources 
has not been an exclusive or primary state function for quite some 
time. Instead, whenever states have failed to address important 
conservation issues, the courts have recognized that the federal 
government has a legitimate role in addressing gaps in conservation 
and preservation efforts.316 For example, in 1900, Congress enacted 
the Lacey Act, which established penalties for the taking of wildlife 
in violation of state laws.317 The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 
311 See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) 
("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments") 
(quoting Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994». 
312 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 499-501 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs 
v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). . 
313 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (granting local 
governments ability to enact zoning ordinances under police power); Johnson, supra note 6, 
at 67 (stating "many courts might consider (local land use) to be an area of ' traditional state 
concern.'''). 
31C See, e.g., Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 500 (providing overview of cases allowing Congress to 
regulate private land for environmental conservation). 
315 Id. at 500-01 (listing legislation since 1900). 
316 See id. ("States may decide to forego or limit conservation efforts in order to lower ... 
costs ••. Congress may take cognizance of this dynamic ... in order to prevent interstate 
competition whose overall effect would damage the quality of the national environment); cf. 
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982) (holding water to be "article 
of commerce"). 
317 Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 
3371-78 (1994»; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 500 (explaining significance of Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
ofl918); Philip Weinberg,Does That Line in theSandlnclude Wetlands? CongressionalPower 
and Environmental Protection, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (News & Analysis) 10894, 
10897 (Sept. 2000). The Lacey Act now applies to all wild animals, including those bred in 
captivity, and to plants protected by treaty or state law. 16 U.S.C. § 3373 (1994) (establishing 
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went a step further in setting a national regulatory agenda for 
conservation by forbidding the takings of a wide range of bird 
species and explicitly preempting inconsistent state laws.318 
Additionally, several federal statutes regulate the taking, manage-
ment or export of wildlife on non-federal property.319 
In 1896, the Supreme Court declared that wildlife was the 
property of the state in Geer v. Connecticut. 32o By the early twenti-
eth century, however, the Court had already began the process of 
carving out significant exceptions to that general rule.321 In 
Missouri v. Holland,322 the Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act as a necessary and proper means of executing Congress' Treaty 
Power.323 The Court stated that the conservation of endangered 
wildlife was a "national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude."324 In 1979 the Court overruled Geer, holding that 
states do not own the wildlife within their borders and that state 
laws regulating wildlife are limited by Congress' authority under the 
Commerce Clause.325 The Court acknowledged that states have a 
legitimate interest in wildlife regulation, but suggested that states 
must share that authority with the federal government.326 
The Supreme Court has also sustained federal conservation 
statutes that apply to non-federal and private land. In 1977, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress had the authority under the 
Commerce Clause to issue federal fishing licenses for use in state 
penalties for violating provision); see Coggins & Harris, supra note 27, at 305·07 (discussing 
1981 Lacey Act Amendments). 
318 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (1994). 
319 See, e.g., The Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1994) 
(forbidding taking, possession, selling, or exporting of bald eagles or any of their parts); 
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (1994 & Supp_ III 1997) 
(regulating taking and export of marine mammals); Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
ManagementActof1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801·83 (1994 & Supp.1II 1997) (establishing national 
standards for fishery conservation). 
320 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding Connecticut statute prohibiting interstate transporta-
tion of game birds that had been killed within state); White, supra note 6, at 248·49. 
321 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329 (1979) ("The erosion of Geer began only 
15 years after it was decided."); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499 (noting "w[as] modified early in the 
twentieth century."). 
322 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
323 [d. at 435. 
32. [d. at 435. 
32S Hughes, 441 U.S. at 326, 335. 
326 [d. at 335-36; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499; White, supra note 6, at 249. 
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waters, and, thus, preempted conflicting state laws.327 Two years 
later, in Andrus v. Allard, the Court stated that the "assumption 
that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife 
is clearly flawed.,,328 In its 1999 decision, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs 
Band of Chippewa Indians ("Mille Lacs"),329 the Court reiterated 
that "[a]1though States have important interests in regulating 
wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this authority 
is shared with the Federal Government when the Federal Govern-
ment exercises one of its enumerated constitutional powers.,,330 In 
Mille Lacs, the Court upheld Chippewa Indian rights under an 1837 
treaty that allowed the Chippewa to hunt, fish, and gather inde-
pendent of territorial, and later state, regulation.331 The Court 
concluded that the Native American treaty rights were "reconcilable 
with state sovereignty over natural resources.,,332 
It is possible to argue that the federal role in conservation has 
focused primarily in areas with significant interstate commercial 
value and that the ESA goes beyond that role. For instance, 
numerous species such as the bald eagle and other migratory birds 
have significant commercial value. 333 Furthermore, hunting and 
fishing licenses can have significant commercial value. Thus, an 
argument can. be made that federal regulation of scarce resources 
has traditionally involved only commerchil activities. By contrast, 
not all endangered or threatened species have commercial value. 
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that federal regulation of 
migratory birds, fishing and hunting does not provide a precedent 
for the ESA. 
However, in light of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in 
Lopez, a better question to ask is whether the ESA interferes with 
321 Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1977). 
328 444 U.S. 51, 63 n.19 (1979). 
329 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
330 Id. at 204. 
331 Id. at 175-76,208. 
332 Id. at 205. 
333 See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 192-95 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing migratory birds have significant value in aggregate and 
affect tourism); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1482 (9th eir. 1996) (destruction 
of bald eagle would have substantial impact on commerce). 
776 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:723 
a traditional area of state regulation.334 States have not tradition-
ally regulated scarce or endangered species.3s5 Even if Congress's 
enactment of the ESA in 1973 expanded the scope of federal 
regulation of scarce resources beyond traditional commercial 
categories, the ESA generally did not displace existing state law 
concerning endangered species, as little state regulation existed. 336 
Because the ESA does not infringe on an area of traditional state 
land use regulation, federal courts should apply a deferential 
approach in analyzing whether the ESA affects interstate commerce 
rather than the constricting approach applied in Lopez, Morrison, 
and even SWANCC. 
While tightening the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Lopez 
decision did not call into question cases holding that the federal 
government has an independent role in conservation of endangered 
wildlife or scarce natural resources. Shortly after Lopez, in Sweet 
Home, the Court upheld a FWS regulation defining "harm" in the 
Endangered Species Act to include "significant habitat modification" 
on both private and public land, although the Court never men-
tioned Lopez or the Commerce Clause.337 Subsequently, several 
lower court decisions have approved federal regulation of non-
federal land despite Lopez. For example, the Ninth Circuit has 
concluded that the Bald Eagle Protection Act is within the scope of 
the Commerce Clause because Congress could rationally conclude 
that "extinction of the eagle would have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce."338 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has held 
that the private, on-site, intrastate disposal of hazardous waste was 
within Congress's authority to regulate because such disposal 
"significantly impacts interstate commerce."339 
334 See supra notes 88·115 and accompanying text (discussing Lopez). 
835 See White, supra note 6, at 250·52 (arguing federal government has greater expertise 
than states in environmental protection and wildlife conservation). 
336 In 1973, Congress enacted the current version of the Endangered Species Act because 
protection of endangered species on federal land alone had failed to stop species extinction, 
and thus state regulation was clearly ineffective. See supra notes 28·29. See also White, 
supra note 6, at 251·52 (arguing state regulation of endangered species is inadequate). 
337 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696·708 
(1995). 
338 Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1482. 
339 United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506, 1509·11 (11th Cir. 1997); Weinberg, supra note 
317, at 10897. 
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The preservation of endangered species is an especially appropri-
ate role for federal regulation. According to Gibbs, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that federal regulation of scarce natural 
resources is often necessary to prevent a "race to the bottom" among 
states engaged in over-exploitation of their resources to compete 
with other states.340 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Ass'n,341 the Court approved federal regulation of 
intrastate mining activities under the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 to prevent ruinous competition among 
states that would likely lead to inadequate environmental stan-
dards.342 In approving federal regulation of intrastate mining 
operations, the Court stated, "The prevention of this sort of 
destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congres-
sional action under the Commerce Clause."343 In Home Builders, 344 
Judge Wald argued: 
The parallels between Hodel v. Virginia and the case 
at hand are obvious. The ESA and the Surface 
Mining Act both regulate activities-destruction of 
endangered species and destruction of the natural 
landscape-that are carried out entirely within a 
State and which are not themselves commercial in 
character. The activities, however, may be regulated 
because they have destructive effects, on environmen-
tal quality in one case and on the availability of a 
variety of species in the other, that are likely to affect 
more than one State. In each case, moreover, inter-
state competition provides incentives to states to 
adopt lower standards to gain an advantage vis-a.-vis 
other states: In Hodel v. Virginia the states were 
motivated to adopt lower environmental standards to 
340 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501·02 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. 
Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
lUI 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
au See id. at 281·82 (observing congressional concern such competition among states 
would prevent "adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders."). 
343 Id. at 282. 
lU4 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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improve the competitiveness of their coal production 
facilities, and in this case, the states are motivated to 
adopt lower standards of endangered species protec-
tion in order to attract development. 345 
There has been a vigorous academic debate about whether 
competition among states results in a lowering of environmental 
standards-a "race-to-the-bottom."346 More important for the 
purposes of this Article is whether Congress has authority under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate the local impacts of interstate 
competition. First, there is evidence that the Framers intended the 
Commerce Clause to allow congressional regulation of commercial 
issues that affected the nation as a whole and could not be effec-
tively addressed at the state level.347 Accordingly, there is a good 
argument based on the Framers' intent that the Commerce Clause 
authorizes Congress to prevent destructive interstate competition.348 
Second, the Supreme Court clearly approved congressional 
regulation of destructive interstate competition in Hodel. 349 Because 
courts still apply a rational basis test in evaluating the constitution-
ality of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause,350 it 
is likely that the Supreme Court would give considerable deference 
34.\ Id. at 1055 (citations and footnote omitted). In dissent, Judge Sentelle argued that 
regulation protecting the habitat was not commercial in character and hence was unlike the 
regulation of commercial intrastate mining in Hodel. Id. at 1066 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
However, he seems to have missed Judge Wald's point that the environmental values 
protected from destructive economic competition in Hodel were at least partially noncommer· 
cial and were similar to the environmental protection of endangered species. 
:us Compare Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard·Setting: Is There a "Race" 
and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HAsTINGS L.J. 271, 352 (1997) (arguing empirical evidence 
suggests interstate competition results in "race-to-the-bottom" that lowers environmental 
standards), with Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
''Race-to-the-Bottom'' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1210, 1211 (1992) (challenging conventional wisdom that interstate competition lowers 
environmental standards and arguing that any losses are more than made up by compensat-
ing gains from increased economic activity). See also Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the 
Bottom and Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 535, 545 
(1997) (responding to critics of his argument disputing "race to the bottom rationale"). 
347 See Engel, supra note 346, at 281-82 (discussing justification for federal regulations). 
348 Id. 
349 Id. at 282. 
350 See infra notes 415-22, 429-38 and accompanying text (discussing viability of rational 
basis test). 
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to a congressional finding that federal regulation is necessary to 
prevent a race to the bottom in a particular area.351 However, 
because C~>ngress never made explicit findings that there was a race 
to the bottom among states that was leading to species extinction, 352 
the Court might refuse to follow Judge Wald's approach in applying 
the Hodel analysis to the ESA. 
On the other hand, the prevention of such a race to the bottom is 
arguably implicit in the ESA's goal of setting uniform standards 
among states. In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit recognized that "[a] 
desire for uniform standards also spurred enactment of the ESA.,,353 
According to the House Report on the 1973 Amendments to the ESA, 
"protection of endangered species is not a matter that can be 
handled in the absence of coherent national and international 
policies: the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized 
policies and programs by various states might well be confusion 
compounded.,,354 The Gibbs Court concluded that the uniform 
standards of the ESA promote interstate commerce by preventing 
companies from having to comply with conflicting state standards.355 
Furthermore, while commentators disagree about whether 
economic competition among states results in an environmental race 
to the bottom, there is little question that many states lack ade-
quate programs for biodiversity and habitat protection.356 It is likely 
that federal regulation will result in greater conservation of 
endangered species, and ultimately promote greater commerce in 
such animals when species achieve recovery. Thus, there are strong 
policy reasons for courts to read the commerce power broadly to 
351 Funk. supra note 14. at 10767. 
3S2 See generally supra notes 27-53 (discussing legislative history of Endangered Species 
Act). The ESA's legislative history does refer to the need for Uniform Standards: 
"[p]rotection of endangered species is not a matter that can be handled in absence of coherent 
national and interstational policies; the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized 
polices and programs by various states might well be confusion compounded." See H.R. Rep. 
93-415. at 5 (1973); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub 
nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
353 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502. 
354 H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973). 
355 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502. 
356 See White, supra note 6, at 250-52 (arguing federal government has greater expertise 
than states in environmental protection and wildlife conservation). 
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include federal regulation of the commerce in and protection of 
endangered species. 
C. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DOES NOT BLUR THE LINE BETWEEN 
FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY 
In his concurring opinion in Lopez, Justice Kennedy argued that 
courts should be cautious in using the Commerce Clause to autho-
rize federal legislation that regulates an "area of traditional state 
concern" to which "States lay claim by right of history and exper-
tise."357 According to Justice Kennedy, courts should carefully 
review federal regulatory statutes that intrude on traditional state 
concerns because such legislation tends to undermine the delicate 
balance between state and federal authority. 358 If the Supreme 
Court approves an overly broad reading of the Commerce Clause, 
"the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority 
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.,,359 
The Endangered Species Act does not blur the line between state 
and federal regulation of wildlife. 360 The ESA extends federal 
regulation only to "a single limited area"361-threatened and 
endangered species, and only after reviewing "those efforts, if any, 
being made by any State ... to protect such species."862 All other 
species are left to state control. 363 Thus, the ESA does not give the 
federal government an unlimited police power inconsistent with the 
Constitution's explicit and implicit concerns about federalism.364 If 
the ESA is successful, eventually most, if not all, endangered species 
will achieve recovery and return to complete state control. 865 
357 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580·83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
358 Id. at 577. 
359 Id. 
360 See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502·03 (discussing principles of cooperative federalism in ESA). 
361 Id. at 503. 
362 Id. 
363 Id. 
3IU Id. 
38S See id. (quoting, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994), which defines "conservation" as "the use 
of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or 
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are 
no longer necessary"). 
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The ESA recognizes the need for cooperative federalism by 
involving the states in the protection of endangered species. For 
instance, the Secretary may list a species as endangered or threat-
ened only after reviewing "those efforts, if any, being made by any 
State ... toprotectsuchspecies."366 Furthermore, the ESAprovides 
that the Secretary of Interior may enter into cooperative programs 
with states that have adequate programs for conserving threatened 
and endangered species and provide financial assistance for such 
programs.367 Finally, once the species has recovered and is 
"delisted," states regain primary authority in regulating the 
species.368 
Using a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause to strike 
down the ESA would intrude on the traditional federal role in the 
conservation of endangered species and unduly expand state 
authority beyond its traditional limits. In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit 
argued: 
It is as threatening to federalism for courts to erode 
the historic national role over scarce resource conser-
vation as it is for Congress to usurp traditional state 
prerogatives in such areas as education and domestic 
relations. Courts seeking to enforce the structural 
constraints of federalism must respect the balance on 
both sides.369 
Despite the state's traditional role in. land use regulation, the 
federal government has taken the primary role in conserving 
endangered species. Federalist principles suggest that the courts 
should read the Commerce Power broadly to support the vital 
federal role in preserving threatened species. 
366 See id. (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(I){A) (1994». 
367 16 U.S.C. §§ 1535(c),{d) (1994). 
368 Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503. 
368 Id. at 505. 
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D. GmBSPROBABLYSUR~SSWANCC 
In Lopez and Morrison, a majority of the Supreme Court put 
limitations on the use of the Commerce Clause to justify broad 
federal intrusion into traditional state areas such as education and 
criminal law. In SWANCC, the Court emphasized "States' tradi-
tional and primary power over land and water use.'>370 While 
SWANCC highlighted the role of states in controlling land use 
decisions, the Court did not suggest that the federal government has 
no role in environmental regulation, an area that does not raise the 
same federalism concerns as gun control and family law. Thus, 
Judge Wilkinson's argument in Gibbs that the conservation of 
endangered species is a special area where the federal government 
has at least concurrent and perhaps primary jurisdiction371 is 
potentially compatible with SWANCC. In Sweet Home, which 
followed Lopez, the Court approved a broad interpretation of federal 
authority over the taking of endangered species on private 
property.372 Accordingly, even if the Supreme Court is strongly 
committed to preserving traditional state authority over land use, 
federalism concerns should not impede the federal regulation of 
scarce resources, including endangered species, which has been a 
primary federal responsibility since the early 20th century. 
VI. COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT's 
GoALS OF PRESERVING OUR GENETIC HERITAGE AND 
PRESERVING BIODIVERSITY 
A. AGGREGATION OF DIFFERENT ENDANGERED SPECIES: ARE THEY 
SIMILAR ENOUGH? 
Because the future benefits of any particular endangered or 
threatened species are usually uncertain, an important issue is 
whether courts may aggregate the economic impact of all endan-
370 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001). 
371 See supra notes 261-87 and accompanying text. 
372 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696·708 
(1995). 
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gered species or must examine the impact of individual species that 
currently have little value. Neither Wickard nor Lopez specify the 
prerequisites for aggregating similar activities in assessing their 
impact on interstate commerce.373 In Morrison, the Court refused 
to aggregate primarily noneconomic activities, such as violent acts 
against women, in determining whether the statute at issue had a 
substantial impact on the interstate commerce.374 By contrast, in 
Gibbs, Judge Wilkinson persuasively argued that preserving red 
wolves has enough of an economic impact even in light of Morrison's 
economic aggregation test to justify the aggregation of all red wolves 
in calculating the value of a regulation preserving them.375 How-
ever, even if the Gibbs Court was correct that red wolves have 
economic value, what about species that have no apparent value? 
In Home Builders,376 Judge Wald seemed to accept the govern-
ment's argument that the limited commercial value of the Delhi 
Sands Flower-Loving Fly was irrelevant and that it was appropriate 
to consider the aggregate value of all endangered species.377 She 
argued that because the Wickard Court considered the impact of all 
wheat on interstate commerce, it was an appropriate analogy for 
courts to aggregate all endangered species in evaluating their 
impact on commerce.378 Similarly, because the ESA is a "compre-
hensive statute" that seeks to maximize both present and future 
economic benefits, the Gibbs court suggested that courts should 
aggregate the total economic and social benefits of preserving 
373 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 226 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting 
neither Wickard nor Lopez specify how similar activities must be to be aggregated); Nagle, 
supra note 8, at 179·80 (making same argument). . 
374 See Morrison v. United States 529 U.S. 598, 615-17 & n.4 (2000) (arguing only 
economic activities should be aggregated in determining whether law has substantial impact 
on interstate commerce). 
375 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 438, 493 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. 
Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
376 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
377 See id. at 1046 (describing clsss to be aggregated as "all similarly situated endangered 
species"); see also Brieffor the Appellees at 27, Nat'l Ass'n. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 96·5354) (asserting "[t]he appropriate analytical framework 
aggregates the effects of all conduct within the class of activities regulated by the challenged 
statutory provision") [hereinafter U.S. Brief]; Nagle, supra note 8, at 194-95 n.83 (noting 
Judge Wald may have been referring to narrow class of "similarly situated" endangered 
species). 
378 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1049 n.7. 
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endangered and threatened species.379 The persuasive reasoning of 
Gibbs suggests that the ESA's prohibition on the taking of such 
species is likely to substantially affect interstate commerce for 
Commerce Clause purposes.380 
Under the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress 
may enact statutes that are necessary and proper to effectuate the 
Commerce Power.381 Because the ESA creates a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme that substantially affects interstate commerce, 
Judge Wald suggested that courts should not focus on the intrastate 
location or noncommercial value of species that are encompassed 
with the necessary and proper workings of the statute.382 She 
quoted Lopez for the principle that "where a general regulatory 
scheme bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis 
character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no 
consequence."383 
Professor Nagle argues that Wickard does not necessarily support 
the aggregation of all endangered species.384 Wickard aggregated 
"all wheat grown by farmers for their personal use," but did not 
aggregate all crops grown by farmers for their personal use.385 
Additionally, while the amount of wheat consumed by the farmer 
directly affected interstate commerce, the destruction of some 
endangered animals with no economic value would not impact 
commerce unless such harm threatens their extinction.386 Professor 
Nagle questions whether it is appropriate to aggregate all endan-
gered species if many of those species lack any significant connec-
tion to interstate commerce.387 While courts have used the broad 
principles inherent in the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow 
Congress to regulate commercial activities that may include a few 
379 See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497 (identifying ESA as "comprehensive" and "far·reaching"). 
380 Id. at 493. 
381 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving Congress powers necessary to execute its 
duties). 
382 Nagle, supra note 8, at 200. 
383 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046, 1053 n.14 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 558 (1995» (emphasis omitted). 
384 Nagle, supra note 8, at 193.95. 
ass Id. at 194. 
386 Id. at 195. 
387 Id. at 197. 
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isolated examples that lack commercial value, Professor Nagle 
argues that it is appropriate for courts to ignore species that lack 
commercial value if there are only a few de minimis examples of 
such noncommercial species-and only if those species are substan-
tially similar enough to be aggregated with species that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.388 While it does not directly 
address 40w courts should aggregate activities, Lopez was clearly 
concerned with overly broad aggregations, especially those that 
interfere with areas of traditional state authority. 389 
The question of whether it is appropriate to aggregate all 
endangered and threatened species depends upon whether they are 
similar enough to be considered together. At first glance, it might 
seem inappropriate to aggregate species that are markedly different 
in biological form such as grizzly bears, flies, and fish. Further-
more, why should courts aggregate commercially valuable species 
with those that lack value? 
There are three good rationales for aggregating all endangered 
species. First, the biodiversity argument postulates that different 
species often affect each other and that, as a result, the environment 
is better off if there are more species in the ecosystem.890 Second, 
the future benefits argument states that while the future value of 
any particular species is often unclear, the future value of preserv-
ing as many threatened and endangered species as possible is 
considerable.391 Finally, courts should defer to legislative findings 
in the ESA that rely on the biodiversity and future benefits 
arguments because, as mentioned below, they do not raise the same 
federalism concerns that attracted heightened scrutiny in Lopez and 
Morrison.892 
SS8 Id. at201-02 (discussing United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d"396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) C'[I]f 
a statute regulates an activity which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial affect 
on interstate commerce •.. 'the de minimis character of individual instances arising under 
the statute is of no consequence.' "». 
389 Id. at 197. 
390 See infra notes 393-401 and accompanying text. 
391 See infra notes 402-28 and accompanying text. 
392 See infra notes 429-38 and accompanying text. 
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B. THE BIODIVERSITY RATIONALE FOR AGGREGATING ENDANGERED 
SPECIES 
The value of biodiversity provides a strong argument for aggre-
gating together endangered and threatened species. As Judge Wald 
suggested in Home Builders,393 the presence of a large number of 
different animal and plant species provides substantial benefits to 
interstate commerce.394 According to Judge Wald, scientific data 
supported congressional findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative 
history that "takings [of endangered species] would have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of 
access to an important natural resource-biodiversity."395 Further-
more, Judge Henderson in her concurring opinion pointed out that 
"[g]iven the interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the extinction of one species affects 
others and their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely 
intrastate species ... will therefore substantially affect land and 
objects that are involved in interstate commerce.,,396 Under the 
biodiversity rationale for aggregation, individual species are 
important only in that each species potentially affects the preserva-
tion oflarge numbers of species.397 Many species that lack individ-
ual commercial value perform important "ecosystem services" such 
as the decomposition of organic matter, renewal of soil, mitigation 
of floods, purification of air and water, or partial stabilization of 
climatic variation.398 These are substantial ecosystem benefits that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Accordingly, the loss of 
even those endangered species that have little present economic 
value frequently adversely impacts other species that have commer-
cial value.399 Because the preservation of as many endangered and 
393 130 F.3d 104l. 
394 [d. at 1052.53. 
395 [d. at 1052·54; Scalero, supra note 6, at 338. 
396 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
397 John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots 
Legislation, 2 HAsTING L.J. 1149, 1164·65 (2001) (detailing subtle and overlooked functions 
of ordinary species). See also Nagle, supra note 8, at 188·89 (discussing importance of large 
number of species). 
398 See Kunich, supra note 397, at 1164·65 (discussing concept of ecosystem survival). 
399 See id. (discussing numerous benefits both apparent and less visible created by living 
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threatened species as possible significantly affects interstate 
commerce by maintaining biodiversity, the aggregation of all 
endangered and threatened species is justifiable under the Wickard 
rule.400 . 
Professor Nagle posits that the biodiversity arguments for 
aggregation suggested by Judge Wald and Judge Henderson go too 
far because their reasoning would justify an "Earth Preservation 
Act" forbidding harm to any natural objects of the earth.401 
However, a limited biodiversity rationale is consistent with 
federalist principles. While it would be inappropriate to infringe on 
traditional state regulation of animals and land use by regulating 
all living things for all time, there is a strong argument for a limited 
and concurrent federal regulatory role in preserving the limited 
number of threatened and endangered species until they can recover 
sufficiently to be returned to state control. Because federal 
regulation in the ESA is limited in both scope and time, the statute 
does not interfere with traditional state control over land use or 
animals. 
C. MAY COURTS CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL FUTURE BENEFITS OF 
ENDANGERED SPECIES? 
Both Judge Wald and Judge Wilkinson argued that it was 
appropriate for courts to consider the future economic benefits and 
medical potential of all endangered species in evaluating whether 
their protection substantially affects interstate commerce. In Home 
Builders, Judge Wald concluded that the ESA substantially affected 
interstate commerce by conserving genetic resources that may have 
future medical value.402 Similarly the Gibbs court argued that, 
under the Commerce Clause, Congress may protect an endangered 
species with no present economic value or effect because it might 
have a significant economic effect in the future.403 By contrast, 
species). 
01 See id. 1164-68 (discussing ecosystem benefits created by having wide variety ofliving 
species) • 
.01 Nagle, supra note 8, at 198-99 . 
.a2 National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050-53 (D.C. Cir. 1997) . 
.a3 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 498 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. 
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Judge Sentelle and Judge Luttig contended that the benefits of the 
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly404 and the Red Wolf05 respectively 
were far too speculative to justify regulation under the Commerce 
Clause. Both argued that there is no proof that either species will 
provide significant future economic or medical benefits.406 
The loss of endangered species threatens significant future 
economic harm by reducing biodiversity and eliminating genetic 
material that could provide valuable medical and other resources. 
Preserving the diversity of plants and animals is important for 
providing a reliable source of food for human beings because over-
reliance on a few crops makes them more vulnerable to disease and 
pests.407 Additionally, plants and animals are sources of chemicals 
and raw materials for many commercial products. 408 Approximately 
half of all drugs used in medicine are derived from plants or 
animals, including several endangered species, with a total value 
exceeding $14 billion per year.409 
Despite rapidly developing scientific knowledge, scientists often 
do not know which species will prove valuable in the future. The 
pharmaceutical industry actively tests plants and animals to 
discover new medicines.410 The biotechnology industry has devel-
oped advanced methods of screening called bioprospecting to 
Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
W4 Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1064-65 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
roll Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
~ See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1064-65 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing fly at issue 
in case has no apparent value); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting) \We are not 
even presented with an activity as to which a plausible case of future economic character and 
impact can be made."); see also Nagle, supra note 8, at 183·84 (admitting there is no available 
evidence of fly's value but scientists do not know everything about fly). 
407 See Coggins & Harris, supra note 27, at 253·55 (discussing crop composition of human 
diets); Kunich, supra note 397, at 1167 (asserting possibility of insignificant species becoming 
significant). For example, American farmers use genes from wild plant species in producing 
nearly $1 billion of crops. Nagle, supra note 8, at 185. 
408 See Coggins & Harris, supra note 27, at 256·57 (providing examples of plants used in 
business and industry). 
409 See id. at 255·56 (discussing role of plants in medicine); Kunich, supra note 397, at 
1163·64 (stating total value of drugs derived from wild organisms is $14 billion per year); 
Nagle, supra note 8, at 185 (noting plants are being studied to find cure for AIDS); White, 
supra note 6, at 243·47 (discussing impact of biological diversity). For instance, an extract 
from the Pacific yew tree is the source of the chemotherapy drug Paclitaxel, which is used to 
treat ovarian and breast carcinomas. Id. at 244·45. 
410 See White, supra note 6, at 244·46 (providing examples of successful pharmaceutical 
discoveries). 
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determine if an organism's genetic material is suitable for creating 
new pharmaceuticals.4l1 Nevertheless, less than one-half of one 
percent of all flowering plants have been assayed for potential 
pharmaceuticals.412 While scientific knowledge about genetics is 
continually advancing, it is impossible to know for certain what 
value a species will have in the future.413 Accordingly, there is a 
strong argument that it is safer to preserve as many species as 
possible because we can never be sure whether a species could be 
useful in the future.414 
Even though many of the future benefits of endangered species 
are necessarily speculative, courts should defer to congressional 
findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative history about the potential 
value of preserving their genetic heritage for future scientific 
development.415 In Gibbs, the majority argued that congressional 
findings about the value of endangered species were entitled to 
significant deference even if the exact value was not clear.41~ The 
. Gibbs court stated: 
Congress is entitled to make the judgment that 
conservation is potentially valuable, even if that 
value cannot be presently ascertained. The Supreme 
Court has held that the congressional decision to 
maintain abandoned railroad track is reasonable 
"even if no future rail use for it is currently foresee-
able." The Court reasoned that "[g]iven the long 
tradition of congressional regulation of railroad 
abandonments, that is a judgment that Congress is 
m White, supra note 6, at 244. 
412 See Marvin J. Cetron & Owen Davies, Trends Now Changing the World: Economics 
and Society, Values and Concerns, Energy and Environment, 35 THE FUTURIsr 30,43 (Jan.-
Feb. 2001) (describing species loss as having "powerful negative impact on human well-being" 
and noting less than 0.5% of plants have been evaluated for pharmaceutical potential); 
Kunich, supra note 397, at 1164 (noting pharmaceuticals come from only few hundred of 
available species). 
413 Kunich, supra note 397, at 1166. 
414 See White, supra note 6, at 246 (arguing as technology advances, different species may 
become important). . 
415 ld. 
416 Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton, 
531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
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entitled to make." Similarly, Congress has long been 
involved in the regulation of scarce and vital natural 
resources. The full payoff of conservation in the form 
of tourism, research, and trade may not be foresee-
able. Yet it is reasonable for Congress to decide that 
conservation of species will one day produce a sub-
stantial commercial benefit to this country and that 
failure to preserve a species will result in permanent, 
though unascertainable, commercialloss.417 
Courts commonly defer to rational congressional concerns about 
the future impacts of regulated activities, including those affecting 
the Commerce Power. For example, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that courts should give additional deference to adminis-
trative agencies addressing the "frontiers" of science such as nuclear 
waste technology.418 Similarly, in TVA v. Hill,419 the Supreme Court 
suggested that courts should defer to congressional concerns in the 
ESA regarding "the unknown uses that endangered species might 
have and about the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in 
the chain of life on this planet."42o More specifically, in holding that 
the Bald Eagle Protection Act was within the scope of the Commerce 
Clause, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bramble421 relied in 
part on the impact that extinction of the eagle would have on future 
interstate commerce: 
Extinction of the eagle would substantially affect 
interstate commerce by foreclosing any possibility of 
several types of commercial activity: future com-
merce in eagles or their parts; future interstate travel 
for the purpose of observing or studying eagles; or 
future commerce in beneficial products derived either 
417 Id. at 496 (citations omitted). 
418 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
419 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
420 Id. at 178·79; accord Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496 rCongress is entitled to make the 
judgment that conservation is potentially valuable, even if that value cannot be presently 
ascertained."). 
421 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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from eagles or from analysis of their genetic 
material.422 
791 
Conversely, critics of the future benefits justification for the ESA 
contend that there is no proof that some endangered species with no 
present economic value will ever have future economic or medical 
benefits.423 Additionally, there would be a stronger case for 
considering uncertain future benefits if an activity has some present 
value or had value in the past. For example, in Preseault v. ICC, 424 
abandoned railroad tracks had some past value and the continued 
presence of the rights-of-way made it plausible that the land might 
be used that way again.425 Accordingly, critics of the future benefits 
justification would argue that there is not a rational basis for 
assuming that endangered species without present economic value 
have benefits that are ever likely to affect interstate commerce in 
any significant manner.426 Yet even these critics acknowledge that 
these species could have unknown benefits yet to be discovered.427 
The question is whether those possible future benefits are enough 
to justify federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
Because it is difficult to predict the future value of any given 
species, it is appropriate for courts to defer to Congress' judgment 
that preserving all endangered species will yield substantial overall 
future economic benefits rather than demanding proof that any 
given species is likely to provide medical or other economic value. 
The ESA is also likely to benefit future medical research and other 
areas of interstate commerce by preserving biodiversity and genetic 
material for future generations. 428 Courts should aggregate the 
benefits of all endangered species because it is impossible to 
estimate all the present, much less the future, effects particular 
422 Id. at 1481. 
~23 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 182·83 (arguing many endangered species lack any present 
on likely future commercial value). 
m 494 U.S. 1 (1990). 
425 Id. at 19. See also Nagle, supra note 8, at206·07 (distinguishing evidence of past effect 
on interstate commerce from speculative effects). 
42S Nagle, supra note 8, at 182·83. 
aT See id. at 183·84 (conceding some endangered species could have future commercial 
value). 
42S See supra notes 393-401 and accompanying text (describing benefits ofbiodiversity). 
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species will have on interstate commerce. Thus, the statute is 
unlike the primarily noneconomic criminal statutes that the Court 
refused to aggregate in Lopez and Morrison. 
D. APPLYING RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW TO THE AGGREGATION ISSUE 
Even after Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court purports to 
apply a rational basis review in deciding whether a statute based on 
the Commerce Clause regulates activities substantially affecting 
interstate commerce.429 In Morrison, the Court stated that there is 
a presumption that a statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Power is constitutional. 480 In enacting the ESA Amendments in 
1973, Congress had a rational basis for believing that the statute 
would advance the nation's long-term commercial interests. 
Accordingly, courts should defer to congressional findings about the 
long-term value of preserving endangered species and their 
irreplaceable genetic heritage. The ESA's goal of preserving genetic 
material of endangered species for the benefit of future generations 
clearly meets a rational basis standard of review even though the 
exact benefit of preserving any given species is often not clear. The 
total benefits from preserving all endangered species are likely to be 
substantial. 
Because Congress had a rational basis for believing the protection 
of all threatened and endangered species would produce both 
present and future social benefits, courts should aggregate all such 
species when evaluating their impact and conclude that the ESA 
substantially affects interstate commerce, both in the present and 
the future. 431 While it is a complex statute addressing both 
economic and noneconomic interests, the ESA's comprehensive 
regulatory scheme substantially affects today's interstate commerce 
by preserving many species that have current substantial economic 
value.432 Even after Lopez and Morrison, if a statute is primarily 
{29 See Dral & Phillips, supra note 79, at 10417·18 (discussing unworkable standards set 
forth in Lopez and Morrison). 
430 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,607 (2000). 
431 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,493 (4th eir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., 
Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001) (aggregating individual takings of red wolves). 
432 [d. at 492.93,497.98. 
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economic in nature, a court looks at its total impact on interstate 
commerce rather than examining individual portions of the 
statutory scheme to determine if each part has substantial impacts 
on commerce.433 
Congress may regulate intrastate activities that do not substan· 
tially affect interstate commerce if they are "an integral part of [a] 
regulatory program" that addresses a broader problem that 
substantially affects interstate commerce.434 Thus, a comprehensive 
scheme that is necessary for regulating interstate commerce may 
reach some activities that are both intrastate and lack substantial 
commercial value.435 While holding that the GFSZA was not such 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme, the Lopez decision confirmed 
this principle and allowed the regulation of "an essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory 
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated."436 By implication, under Lopez, if a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme is needed to address a serious national problem 
that substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress may, as 
part of an integral scheme, regulate intrastate activities that do not 
in themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.437 In 
applying this principle of aggregation to the ESA, courts should 
defer to the congressional judgment that the ESA's integral 
regulatory scheme is necessary to protect important interstate 
commercial interests even "if the statute may encompass some 
intrastate species that presently lack substantial impacts on 
interstate commerce in their own right.438 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Author would prefer to return to the more deferential review 
oflegislation applied before Lopez. However, even in light of Lopez, 
433 See, e.g., id. at 492·93 (looking at effect of takings total impact). 
434 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981). 
~ Id. 
~ United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
mId.; see also Vermeule, supra note 97, at 11335 (discussing "comprehensive scheme 
principle" in Lopez). 
438 See supra notes 415·22 (arguing court should defer to congressional findings). 
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Morrison and SWANCC, the ESA's regulation of intrastate endan-
gered species is clearly constitutional. Since the early 20th century, 
the federal government has exercised concurrent or primary 
authority to conserve endangered species and resources. By 
contrast, in Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC, the challenged legisla-
tion intruded in areas of traditional state concern. The long history 
of federal regulation of endangered species and scarce natural 
resources supports a finding of legitimacy under the Commerce 
Power. In light of their concurring opinion in Lopez and support for 
protection of endangered species on private lands in Sweet Home, 
there is reason to believe that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, 
likely the Court's swing voters, might take a more deferential 
approach to federal regulation of intrastate endangered species 
under the Commerce Clause. 
Additionally, the ESA does not undermine federalism nor blur 
the state-federal distinction. Because its scope is limited to 
endangered and threatened species, the ESA does not broadly 
displace state authority and is unlike the intrusive federal statutes 
in Lopez and Morrison that were found to have impermissibly 
interfered with traditional state concerns. Furthermore, the federal 
government returns control of species that achieve recovery to the 
states. By leaving all non-threatened species to state control, the 
ESA recognizes that states and the federal government share 
concurrent, yet well demarcated, roles in regulating animals. Under 
the ESA's well-defined jurisdiction, there is no danger that species 
with abundant populations will fall under federal control. 
Perhaps the most difficult and complex issue discussed in this 
Article is whether it is appropriate to aggregate commercial 
valuable species with those that currently lack value. While 
Wickard suggests that Congress has broad authority to aggregate 
activities that in themselves have little value, the Supreme Court 
has never established a clear test for when aggregation is proper 
under the Commerce Power. Under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Congress has authority to enact statutes that regulate 
activities that have a significant commercial impact even if the 
regulation encompasses some items that lack commercial value. 
The unanswered question concerns the limits of aggregation when 
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Congress adopts necessary and proper measures to enforce the 
commerce power. 
This Article offers three arguments for aggregating all threatened 
and endangered species in assessing their impact on interstate 
commerce. First, preserving as many threatened and endangered 
species as possible promotes biodiversity. Even a species that lacks 
its own commercial value may affect others that have such value. 
Second, while the future value of preserving endangered or threat-
ened species is somewhat speculative, courts should defer to 
legislative findings that preserving genetic material of these species 
is likely to produce significant future benefits in medical research 
and other commercial areas. The legislative history of the 1973 ESA 
amendments demonstrates that Congress believed that the national . 
government should err on the side of preservation because the loss 
of species and their genetic material could create incalculable losses. 
Because it is impossible to know the precise value of endangered 
species in the future, courts ought to give greater deference to 
congressional concerns than when reviewing noneconomic regula-
tions that significantly intrude on traditional areas of state 
regulation. Finally, under the rational basis test used in Lopez and 
Morrison, courts should defer to congressional findings that 
preserving endangered species will serve the nation's long-term 
national interests. Accordingly, under these three justifications, 
Congress may regulate even the most commercially invaluable and 
geographically isolated species pursuant to its broad authority 
under the Commerce Clause. 

